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CAFA's NEW "MINIMAL DIVERSITY" STANDARD FOR
INTERSTATE CLASS ACTIONS CREATES A
PRESUMPTION THAT JURISDICTION EXISTS, WITH
THE BURDEN OF PROOF ASSIGNED TO THE
PARTY OPPOSING JURISDICTION'
H. Hunter Twiford, III,2 Anthony Rollo,3 and John T Rouse4
I. INTRODUCTION
The Class Action Fairness Act of 20055 (CAFA) has reshaped the
class-action landscape so dramatically that it will take years for class-action
practitioners and the courts to understand its wholesale changes in the law
and broad ramifications. These new provisions constitute the most sweep-
ing changes to class-action practice in a generation, rendering obsolete
many preexisting standards and practices. This landmark tort reform legis-
lation has two principal components. First, CAFA "federalizes" most inter-
state class actions now in the state courts. It accomplishes this
transformation through its revolutionary "minimal-diversity" jurisdictional
provisions that substantially expand federal jurisdiction over class actions,
1. The views and opinions expressed in this article are exclusively the personal views of the
authors only, and do not represent the views of McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC, its attorneys, or their
clients.
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and through its drastically liberalized rules for removal of class actions.
Second, CAFA enacts a "Consumers' Class Action Bill of Rights" that pro-
vides new consumer-protection standards in the context of class-action set-
tlement practices.6
This article analyzes the critical interplay between CAFA's new, ex-
pansive minimal-diversity and removal standards for interstate class actions
on the one hand, and the preexisting, restrictive "complete diversity" and
related removal standards on the other. Among other things, CAFA
amended 28 U.S.C. 1332, which prior to CAFA allowed for complete-diver-
sity jurisdiction only. CAFA adds the new minimal-diversity jurisdictional
grant under amended 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). Specifically, section 1332(d)(2)
now vests original minimal-diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts over
interstate class actions that, generally, are those class actions with 100 or
more plaintiffs in which the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 and
at least one plaintiff and one defendant are citizens of different states.7
Since enactment of CAFA's jurisdictional centerpiece-28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)-a critically important disagreement has arisen in the courts be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants over which party bears the burden of estab-
lishing the existence or nonexistence of minimal-diversity jurisdiction
under CAFA. The face of new 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) is silent on this precise
point. Generally speaking, many jurisdictional contests involve close facts
or close legal issues, and the outcome in these instances is often decided
against the party who bears the burden of proof. In a class-action context,
6. For a more detailed discussion of the various changes in class-action practice brought about
by CAFA, see Anthony Rollo & Gabriel A. Crowson, Mapping the New Class Action Frontier-A
Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act and Amended Federal Rule 23, 59:1 & 2 Consumer Fin. L.Q.
Rep. (2005); Anthony Rollo & Gabriel A. Crowson, The Newly Enacted Class Action Fairness Act, Part
1, 8:17 Consumer Fin. Servs. L. Rep. (2005); Anthony Rollo & Gabriel A. Crowson, The Newly Enacted
Class Action Fairness Act, Part 2, 8:18 Consumer Fin. Servs. L. Rep. (2005); John T. Kolinski, The Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 APR FLBJ 18 (2006); David F. Herr & Michael C. McCarthy, The Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005-Congress Again Wades into Complex Litigation Management, 228 F.R.D.
673 (2005); Warren W. Harris & Erin Glenn Busby, Highlights of the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005-The Future of Class Actions in America, 72 DEF. COUNS. J. 228 (2005); Aashish Y. Desai, The
Class Action Fairness Act, 47-JUL OCLAW 20 (2005); Linda Pissott Reig, Charles E. Erway III, &
Brian P. Sharkey, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: Overview, Historical Perspective, and Settle-
ment Requirements, 40 TTIPU 1087 (2005).
7. Once minimal-diversity subject matter jurisdiction is established at the threshold, CAFA pro-
cedurally allows a federal district court to "decline to exercise" its minimal-diversity jurisdiction on a
discretionary or mandatory basis, under certain conditions. Section 1332(d)(3) provides that the district
court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a class action in which more than one-third, but less than
two-thirds, of the proposed class members in the aggregate and the primary defendants are citizens of
the forum state, subject to certain judicial considerations. Section 1332(d)(4) provides that the district
court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction over a class action (1) when more than two-thirds of the
members of the class in the aggregate are citizens of the forum state and at least one defendant from
whom significant relief is sought or whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims as-
serted is also a member of the forum state, and the principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct
or any related conduct were incurred in the forum state; or (2) when two-thirds or more proposed class
members and the primary defendants are citizens of the forum state. This analysis involves abstention
principles that assume that subject matter jurisdiction exists at the threshold. See Anthony Rollo, H.
Hunter Twiford, III & Gabriel A. Crowson, Practitioners Review "Abstention Procedure" under Sec-
tions 1332(d)(3) and (4), 9:2 Consumer Fin. Servs. L. Rep. (2005).
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where the stakes are very high, the outcome of motion practice to deter-
mine whether the case proceeds in federal or state court can have enor-
mous implications for both parties.
Historically, under well-settled jurisprudence in the complete-diversity
context, the party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of estab-
lishing that all jurisdictional requirements have been met, with all doubts
resolved against a finding that jurisdiction exists. For purposes of this arti-
cle, this test with its presumption against jurisdiction is referred to as the
"Complete Diversity Standard."
The Complete Diversity Standard-which applies both to class actions
and non-class actions alike brought in federal court on complete-diversity
grounds-flows from Congress's intent to limit access to the federal courts
on federalism grounds under its statutory grant of complete-diversity juris-
diction. In practice, the Complete Diversity Standard favors a plaintiff who
files a class action in state court and then seeks remand following the de-
fendants' removal to federal court on complete-diversity grounds, where
the defendants bear the jurisdictional burden of proof.
Under CAFA, however, Congress sought to sweepingly expand access
to the federal courts for the narrow category of interstate class actions by
creating minimal-diversity jurisdiction. Among other things, in Section 2 of
the Act, "Findings and Purposes," Congress stated that prior abuses in class
actions undermined "the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by
the Framers of the United States Constitution," in that state and local
courts kept cases of national importance out of federal court and some-
times demonstrated bias against out-of-state defendants. Also in Section 2
of CAFA, Congress stated that one purpose of the Act is to "restore the
intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by providing for
Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance
under diversity jurisdiction."
Congress's "Findings and Purposes" expressly reflect a goal of chang-
ing the jurisdictional status quo for class actions. Section 2 and the other
operative provisions of CAFA, along with CAFA's legislative history,
clearly show that Congress intended to extend federal jurisdiction over in-
terstate class actions which, prior to CAFA's enactment, could not be main-
tained in or removed to federal court under the existing-and restrictive-
Complete Diversity Standard.
Today, defendants who remove class actions under CAFA contend
that, in light of this congressional intent to give special treatment to inter-
state class actions by sweeping them into federal court, the Complete Di-
versity Standard does not apply in any jurisdictional contest. Instead, they
argue that the jurisdictional burden of proof falls on the party opposing
federal jurisdiction to establish that the requirements for minimal diversity
have not been met, with all doubts to be decided in favor of a finding that
2005]
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jurisdiction exists. For purposes of this article, this new standard, applica-
ble only to interstate class actions under CAFA, with a presumption in
favor of jurisdiction, is called the "Minimal Diversity Standard."8
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the Complete Diversity
Standard should still be applied when evaluating jurisdiction under CAFA.
As a result, a split in the courts has developed over whether to apply the
Complete Diversity Standard or the Minimal Diversity Standard to inter-
state class actions under CAFA. The answer to this question, as a practical
matter, often determines the jurisdictional outcome of the case.
This article reviews the separate statutory bases for complete- and
minimal-diversity jurisdiction, discusses the congressional intent behind the
enabling statutes for both, and analyzes all the cases to date that have ad-
dressed the burden-of-proof question under CAFA.
The authors conclude that the courts should apply the Minimal Diver-
sity Standard in interstate class actions under CAFA. That is, correctly in-
terpreted, CAFA's statutory text, purpose, and legislative history create a
presumption in favor of finding that minimal-diversity jurisdiction exists,
with all doubts resolved in favor of jurisdiction, and with the burden of
proof on the party opposing jurisdiction. Any other result would defeat
Congress's clear intent in crafting this special-purpose statute. 9
II. WELL-SETLED PRINCIPLES OF COMPLETE DIVERSITY
The concept of diversity jurisdiction has its genesis in Article III of the
United States Constitution, which gives the federal courts authority to hear
cases between citizens of different states. Prior to February 18, 2005, 28
U.S.C. 1332 (and its predecessor statutory provisions) limited original fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction solely to those cases in which there was "com-
plete diversity" of citizenship among the litigants and the amount in
controversy exceeded $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
This grant of complete-diversity jurisdiction is found in section
1332(c), which reads in part as follows:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and
is between-
8. The U.S. Supreme Court permits the creation of jurisdictional "presumptions," which can be
"rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a
clear incompatibility." These presumptions may be in favor of or against the exercise of federal juris-
diction. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981) (presumption of concurrent
state and federal jurisdiction); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1044 (presumption of federal jurisdic-
tion "in the absence of a plain statement [from a state court] that the decision below rested on an
adequate and independent state ground"); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890) (common-law doc-
trine of sovereign immunity creates presumption against jurisdiction).
9. The authors rely in large part on Section 2 of CAFA in concluding that the decisions stating
to the contrary are incorrectly decided. Section 2's clear statement of Congressional "Findings and
Purposes," which is part of the text of the Act itself, has been overlooked by most of the courts that
have considered the burden-of-proof issue to date.
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(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a for-
eign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or
subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this
title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different
States.
For the purposes of this section, section 1335, and section
1441, an alien admitted to the United States for permanent
residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which
such alien is domiciled.
(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise
made in a statute of the United States, where the plaintiff
who files the case originally in the Federal courts is finally
adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or value
of $75,000, computed without regard to any setoff or coun-
terclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be enti-
tled, and exclusive of interest and costs, the district court
may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose
costs on the plaintiff.
(c) For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this
title-
(1) a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any
State by which it has been incorporated and of the State
where it has its principal place of business, except that in
any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract
of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorpo-
rated, to which action the insured is not joined as a party-
defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the
State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as of any State
by which the insurer has been incorporated and of the State
where it has its principal place of business; and
(2) the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall
be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the de-
cedent, and the legal representative of an infant or incompe-
tent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State
as the infant or incompetent.
(d) The word "States" as used in this section, includes the
Territories, the District of Columbia, and the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico. 10
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Complete-diversity jurisdiction under section 1332(c) historically has
provided limited access to the federal courts for that small group of class
actions whose litigants met those jurisdictional requirements. Complete di-
versity remains a separate and independent ground for federal jurisdiction
over class actions following CAFA's enactment. But complete-diversity ju-
risdiction is a doorway to federal court that, for many class actions, never
opens due to its strict limitations. The courts in this context consistently
apply the Complete Diversity Standard, holding that the party invoking
complete-diversity jurisdiction in a class action has the burden to demon-
strate that the court possesses subject matter jurisdiction, with all doubts to
be resolved against a finding that federal jurisdiction exists."
Significantly, the requirements for complete diversity are statutory
limitations-not constitutional-and the burden of proof under the Com-
plete Diversity Standard as articulated by the courts flows from the con-
gressional intent underpinning the complete-diversity statute. The United
States Constitution does not mandate complete diversity for a case to pro-
ceed in federal court; all the Constitution requires is "minimal diversity."' 2
While the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress may enact laws
that require complete diversity, it has also noted that Congress may pro-
mulgate laws requiring only minimal diversity-such as in CAFA-thus
permitting suits to proceed in federal court as long as "any two adverse
parties are not co-citizens.'
13
When complete diversity is the basis for federal court jurisdiction, 4
the courts have been forced to grapple with the dichotomy between al-
lowing the plaintiff to choose the forum in which to litigate, and the defen-
dant's right to remove the case to federal court and to have the "equal
benefit" of federal court jurisdiction. 5 In addressing this issue, courts over
time have had to determine the congressional intent behind the statute cre-
ating complete-diversity jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held that the
requirements of the complete-diversity statute were intended by Congress
to "drastically restrict" access to a federal forum, in part based on federal-
ism concerns.' 6 The Court noted that this congressional intent to limit fed-
eral court access is found in the complete-diversity statute and in the
11. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-83 (1936); FW/PBS, Inc. v.
Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); and Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,
523 U.S. 83, 104 (1998).
12. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 applies to controversies "between Citizens of different States."
13. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
14. For a historical view of federal court diversity jurisdiction, consult Charles Warren, New
Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 83 (1923).
15. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 348 (1816). See also Ry. Co. v. Whitton, 80
U.S. 270, 287 (1871) (protection against local prejudice is secured by giving plaintiff an election of
courts before suit is brought, and "where the suit was commenced in a State court[,] a like election to
the defendant afterwards"); Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 86 U.S. 214, 224 (1873) ("The [removal] statute is reme-
dial, and must be construed liberally.").
16. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) ("The policy of the [complete diversity] statute calls
for its strict construction."); see also St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288
(1938).
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successive amendments to that statute that raised the minimum amount in
controversy in complete-diversity cases. 7
To ensure adherence to Congress's intent to limit access under diver-
sity jurisdiction to only those cases in which there is complete diversity, the
courts over time have imposed a burden-of-proof requirement on the party
seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction to establish complete diversity. Thus,
the burden of proof in complete-diversity cases flows directly from the
courts' understanding that the congressional intent under the enabling stat-
ute was to limit access to federal courts and to favor state forums whenever
possible.18
Significantly, just like the minimal-diversity provisions under CAFA
found at 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), the complete-diversity provisions of 28 U.S.C.
1332(c) are silent as to which party bears the burden of proving whether
jurisdiction exists.
III. MINIMAL DIVERSITY: CAFA SUBSTANTIALLY EXPANDS FEDERAL
JURISDICTION OVER INTERSTATE CLASS ACTIONS
Just as the courts were required to determine congressional intent
under the complete-diversity statute before they could conclude that the
jurisdictional burden of proof should be allocated to the proponent of fed-
eral jurisdiction, the courts must now separately examine the burden-of-
proof question under CAFA's new minimal-diversity statutory provisions.
From its effective date of February 18, 2005,19 CAFA profoundly
changed the existing rules and principles governing jurisdiction over inter-
state class actions by introducing the new vehicle of minimal diversity,
17. Healy, 292 U.S. at 270. To further that end, the Supreme Court has instructed the federal
courts to narrowly construe the amount-in-controversy provision so as not to frustrate congressional
purpose. See id. at 269-70; Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1969).
18. Congress's historical intent to "drastically" restrict federal jurisdiction in controversies be-
tween citizens of different states by its adherence to the complete-diversity principles has always been
"rigorously enforced by the courts." See St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 288; Snyder, 394 U.S. at 340-41;
City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76 (1941) ("The policy of the [complete diversity]
statute calls for its strict construction, and in defining the boundaries of diversity jurisdiction, this Court
must be mindful of this guiding Congressional policy.").
19. Section 9 of CAFA, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 14, states that the amendments made by the
Act shall apply to any civil action commenced on or after the date of enactment. CAFA became effec-
tive on February 18, 2005, the date of its signature by the President. If a lawsuit was "commenced"
prior to February 18, 2005, the federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction under the
minimal-diversity provisions of CAFA and there is no basis for removal to federal court. If the case
was "commenced" on or after February 18, 2005, the minimal-diversity provisions of CAFA clearly
apply, and the case is subject to removal. The courts have uniformly upheld the fact that CAFA's
effective date was February 18, 2005. See, e.g., Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 424 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2005); Knud-
sen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2005) (in some circumstances the suit may be
considered "commenced" anew after February 18, 2005, even though initially filed earlier, in order to
be removable under CAFA); Bush v. Cheaptickets, Inc., 425 F.3d 683, (9th Cir. 2005); Pritchett v.
Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005); Awaida v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ. 05-425 (not available
on Westlaw or LexisNexis) (W.D. Okla. June 7, 2005); Isaacs v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ. 05-0426 (not
available on Westlaw or LexisNexis) (W.D. Okla. June 21, 2005). A more thorough discussion of the
"date of commencement" issue is beyond the scope of this article, but individual case summaries along
with the full text of each case may be found at http://www.cafalawblog.com.
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which effectively "federalizes" interstate class actions. Numerous class ac-
tions that could not be brought in or removed to federal court based on
complete-diversity jurisdiction can now be brought in or removed to fed-
eral court on the basis of minimal diversity.2 °
A. New 28 U.S.C. 1332 (d) (2)
CAFA amended the jurisdictional provisions of section 1332 to add
new section 1332(d). The provisions of this section specifically apply to
interstate class actions filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 or
similar state statutes, and to mass actions involving 100 or more plaintiffs.
Section 1332(d)(2), which enables minimal-diversity jurisdiction, now reads
as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
a class action in which-
(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State
different from any defendant;
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a
citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a
citizen of a State; or
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State
and any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of
a foreign state.2'
Congress drastically liberalized the inherent constraints under the
Complete Diversity Standard that previously prevented interstate class ac-
tions from being filed in, or removed to, federal court. That this was Con-
gress's intent is shown by the dramatic and sweeping changes it made
throughout the operative language of the statute. These significant depar-
tures from pre-CAFA law as it existed under the Complete Diversity Stan-
dard are aimed, in part, at preventing or minimizing what Congress viewed,
in Section 2 of the Act, as abuses involving class actions implicating inter-
state commerce that belonged in federal court but were trapped in state
courts.
20. It is now possible for a federal court to exercise complete-diversity jurisdiction over a class
action where minimal-diversity jurisdiction is lacking, to exercise minimal-diversity jurisdiction over a
class action where complete-diversity jurisdiction is lacking, and/or to exercise jurisdiction over a class
action alternatively on both complete- and minimal-diversity grounds.
21. CAFA's minimal-diversity grant, however, does not apply to all interstate class actions. Spe-
cifically, minimal diversity is inapplicable to (1) cases where the primary defendants are state or govern-
ment entities; (2) cases where the aggregate number of class members is less than 100; (3) cases
involving certain covered securities under the federal securities laws; and (4) cases relating to the inter-
nal affairs or governance of a corporation arising under the law of the state in which the corporation is
incorporated. 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(5) and (9).
[VOL. 25:7
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For example, as noted above, federal jurisdiction now exists as long as
any single named plaintiff or putative class member is a citizen of a differ-
ent state from any one defendant, and the numerosity and $5,000,000 juris-
dictional amount-in-controversy requirements are satisfied. In other
words, diversity of citizenship is no longer required to be "complete" for
interstate class actions. CAFA further now permits the aggregation of class
members' claims, statutorily overruling for interstate class actions existing
jurisprudence in the complete-diversity context that had previously limited
the prospect for federal court treatment of many class actions by requiring
either that each plaintiff in a class action independently satisfy the $75,000
amount-in-controversy requirement, or that at least one named plaintiff
satisfy this requirement.2
In addition to its changes eliminating the need for complete diversity
of citizenship and allowing aggregation of class member claims, CAFA fur-
ther expands federal jurisdiction through its new definition of "class ac-
tion,, 23 and by inviting to federal courts for the first time "mass actions"
with more than 100 plaintiffs, which is a new category coined under this
law.24 Similarly, CAFA now exempts interstate class actions from the one-
year time limitation for removal that otherwise applies under the Complete
Diversity Standard. 5 And, contrary to the preexisting rule under the Com-
plete Diversity Standard, CAFA now provides that a class action "may be
removed by any defendant without the consent of all defendants, and fur-
ther, without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the state
where the action is brought."26
In addition to this broad expansion of federal jurisdiction at the trial
court level, CAFA creates sweeping new federal appellate jurisdiction over
orders remanding class actions that were removed under the Act. Prior to
CAFA, 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) barred appellate review of virtually all remand
22. In Exxon-Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2627-28
(2005), the Supreme Court acknowledged that CAFA "abrogates the rule against aggregating claims"
first recognized in Supreme Tribe ofBen-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921), and "reaffirmed" in Zahn
v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). See also Gregory P. Joseph, Federal Class Action Juris-
diction After Cafa, Exxon Mobil and Grable, 8 DEL. L. REV. 157 (2006).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1), as amended by CAFA, which tracks the language of new 28 U.S.C.
§ 1711, provides:
"In this subsection-
(A) the term "class" means all of the class members in a class action;
(B) the term "class action" means any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to
be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action;
(C) the term "class certification order" means an order issued by a court approving the treat-
ment of some or all aspects of a civil action as a class action; and
(D) the term "class members" means the persons (named or unnamed) who fall within the
definition of the proposed or certified class in a class action."
24. The term "mass action" means "any civil action (except a civil action within the scope of
section 1711(2)) in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly
on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact, except that jurisdic-
tion shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount
requirements under subsection (a)." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(11)(B)(i).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).
2005]
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orders in matters removed on complete-diversity jurisdiction grounds.
New 28 U.S.C. 1453(c), however, now permits discretionary appeals of or-
ders denying or granting motions to remand class actions. This new provi-
sion also requires that the courts of appeals expedite resolution of CAFA
appeals, showing an unusually heightened concern by Congress over this
special category of cases.
B. Congress's "Findings and Purposes" Behind CAFA
Are Found in the Text of CAFA
Significantly, Congress wrote in the text of CAFA, in Section 2, a clear
statement of its "Findings and Purposes" with respect to enacting CAFA.
Surprisingly, Section 2 has been mentioned or referenced by only a few
courts in connection with a ruling on the burden-of-proof question. Sec-
tion 2, which now appears in the Historical and Statutory Notes section of
new 28 U.S.C. 1711, reads as follows:
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS. Congress finds the following:
(1) Class action lawsuits are an important and valuable
part of the legal system when they permit the fair and
efficient resolution of legitimate claims of numerous
parties by allowing the claims to be aggregated into a
single action against a defendant that has allegedly
caused harm.
(2) Over the past decade, there have been abuses of the
class action device that have
(A) harmed class members with legitimate claims
and defendants that have acted responsibly;
(B) adversely affected interstate commerce; and
(C) undermined public respect for our judicial
system.
(3) Class members often receive little or no benefit
from class actions, and are sometimes harmed, such as
where
(A) counsel are awarded large fees, while leaving
class members with coupons or other awards of lit-
tle or no value;
(B) unjustified awards are made to certain plain-
tiffs at the expense of other class members; and
(C) confusing notices are published that prevent
class members from being able to fully understand
and effectively exercise their rights.
(4) Abuses in class actions undermine the national judi-
cial system, the free flow of interstate commerce, and
the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the
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framers of the United States Constitution, in that State
and local courts are
(A) keeping cases of national importance out of
Federal court;
(B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate
bias against out-of-State defendants; and
(C) making judgments that impose their view of
the law on other States and bind the rights of the
residents of those States.
(b) PURPOSES. The purposes of this Act are to
(1) assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members
with legitimate claims;
(2) restore the intent of the framers of the United
States Constitution by providing for Federal court con-
sideration of interstate cases of national importance
under diversity jurisdiction; and
(3) benefit society by encouraging innovation and low-
ering consumer prices.
Thus, Section 2 of CAFA evidences Congress's plain desire to change
and to correct the problems with the jurisdictional status quo when the
restrictive Complete Diversity Standard kept interstate class actions from
making their way to the federal courts where Congress felt they belonged.
C. Congress Expressly Allocated the Burden of Proof to the Party
Opposing Jurisdiction in CAFA's Legislative History
CAFA's legislative history includes both a House Sponsors' Statement
and a Senate Judiciary Committee Report, each of which shows that Con-
gress expressly allocated the jurisdictional burden of proof in minimal-di-
versity contests on the party opposing jurisdiction.
On February 17, 2005, Representative F. James Sensenbrenner (R.
Wis.) inserted a statement of the intent of the creators of CAFA into the
House record.27 The Senate Judiciary Committee published its separate
report on CAFA on February 28, 2005.28 Both state that the drafters of
CAFA intended that a new standard apply for the jurisdictional burden of
proof, one different from the existing rule for complete diversity that had
previously blocked interstate class actions from access to federal court.
This legislative history reflects Congress's desire that there be a pre-
sumption in favor of a finding that jurisdiction exists. The extent to which
this unambiguous legislative history should be considered by the courts in
determining which party bears the jurisdictional burden of proof under
27. 151 Cong. Rec. H723-02, at H727-29 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005).
28. S. Rep. 109-14 (2005). Although the Senate Committee Report was "ordered to be printed
on" February 28, it was submitted to Congress before CAFA became law. See 151 Cong. Rec. S978
(Feb. 3, 2005).
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CAFA is now the subject of considerable controversy, and perhaps may not
be resolved conclusively until decided by the Supreme Court.
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report, published on February 28,
2005,29 states:
Pursuant to new subsection 1332(d)(6), the claims of the in-
dividual class members in any class action shall be aggre-
gated to determine whether the amount in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000 (exclusive of interest
and costs). The Committee intends this subsection to be in-
terpreted expansively. If a purported class action is removed
pursuant to these jurisdictional provisions, the named plain-
tiff(s) should bear the burden of demonstrating that the re-
moval was improvident (i.e., that the applicable
jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied). And if a fed-
eral court is uncertain about whether "all matters in contro-
versy" in a purported class action "do not in the aggregate
exceed the sum or value of $5,000,000," the court should err
in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the case.
Overall, new section 1332(d) is intended to expand substan-
tially federal court jurisdiction over class actions. Its provi-
sions should be read broadly, with a strong preference that
interstate class actions should be heard in a federal court if
properly removed by any defendant.
As noted above, it is the intent of the Committee that
the named plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demon-
strating that a case should be remanded to state court (e.g.,
the burden of demonstrating that more than two-thirds of
the proposed class members are citizens of the forum state).
Allocating the burden in this manner is important to ensure
that the named plaintiffs will not be able to evade federal
jurisdiction with vague class definitions or other efforts to
obscure the citizenship of class members.
It is the Committee's intention with regard to each of these
exceptions that the party opposing federal jurisdiction shall
29. S. Rep. 109-14 (2005). The Seventh Circuit, speaking through Judge Easterbrook, declined to
consider the statements in the Senate Report in Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446
(7th Cir. 2005), in its observations that "[t]hirteen Senators signed this report and five voted not to send
the proposal to the floor. Another 82 Senators did not express themselves on the question; likewise 435
Members of the House and one President kept their silence." However, the Seventh Circuit erred in its
ruling by applying an incorrect canon of statutory construction, see discussion infra Section V.A., where
the correct standard specifically required that court to look to and follow the congressional intent be-
hind CAFA. In addition, the Seventh Circuit in Brill erred by not considering Congress's specific intent
stated in Section 2 of the Act.
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have the burden of demonstrating the applicability of an ex-
emption. Thus, if a plaintiff seeks to have a class action re-
manded under section 1332(d)(4)(A) on the ground that the
primary defendants and two-thirds or more of the class
members are citizens of the home state, that plaintiff shall
have the burden of demonstrating that these criteria are met
by the lawsuit. Similarly, if a plaintiff seeks to have a pur-
ported class action remanded for lack of federal diversity
jurisdiction under subsection 1332(d)(5)(B) ("limited
scope" class actions), that plaintiff should have the burden
of demonstrating that "all matters in controversy" do not
"in the aggregate exceed the sum or value of $5,000,000, ex-
clusive of interest and costs" or that "the number of all pro-
posed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is less than 100."10
The House Sponsors' Statement was inserted, rather than read, into
the House record as a result of debate-related time constraints. Represen-
tative Sensenbrenner began the statement by explaining, "I have a lengthy
additional statement explaining how this bill is to work. We do not have
the time in general debate for me to give this statement on the floor, so I
will insert the statement relative to the intent of the managers of the bill in
the record at this point."31 The House Sponsors' Statement begins its sec-
tion-by-section analysis of CAFA with the new jurisdictional provisions to
be added as new 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), found in Section 4 of CAFA:
Section 4 gives Federal courts jurisdiction over class action
lawsuits in which the aggregate amount in controversy ex-
ceeds $5 million, and at least one plaintiff and one defen-
dant are diverse. Overall, new section 1332(d) is intended to
expand substantially Federal court jurisdiction over class ac-
tions. Its provisions should be read broadly, with a strong
preference that interstate class actions should be heard in a
Federal court if removed by any defendant. If a purported
class action is removed under these jurisdictional provisions,
the named plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demon-
strating that the removal was improper. And if a Federal
court is uncertain about whether the $5 million threshold is
satisfied, the court should err in favor of exercising jurisdic-
tion over the case.32
Both the House Sponsors' Statement and the Senate Committee Re-
port unmistakably state congressional intent to assign the burden of proof
squarely upon the shoulders of the party opposing the existence of federal
30. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 42-44 (2005) (emphasis added).
31. 151 Cong. Rec. H723-02, at H727 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005).
32. Id. (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction under CAFA's new minimal-diversity provisions. This uniform
legislative history is entirely consistent with CAFA's statutory "Findings
and Purposes," the other operative provisions of the Act, and Congress's
objective of minimizing class-action abuses in the state courts by sweeping
interstate class actions into federal court where those matters previously
could not be maintained.
IV. THE COURTS ARE Now SPLIT OVER WHO BEARS THE
JURISDICTIONAL BURDEN OF Proof Under CAFA
Some courts addressing the question of which party bears the burden
of proof have concluded that the party opposing minimal-diversity jurisdic-
tion under CAFA bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction does
not exist. Under this Minimal Diversity Standard, those courts suggest that
CAFA creates a presumption of federal jurisdiction over interstate class
actions, with all doubts to be resolved in favor of a finding of federal
jurisdiction.
Other courts addressing this issue have concluded to the contrary, and
applied the Complete Diversity Standard to interstate class actions assert-
ing minimal-diversity jurisdiction. Those courts have found that the party
asserting minimal-diversity jurisdiction under CAFA bears the burden of
establishing that all jurisdictional requirements have been met, and have
applied the Complete Diversity Standard's attendant presumption against
federal jurisdiction, with all doubts to be resolved against a finding of juris-
diction. Many of these courts have mechanically applied the Complete Di-
versity Standard in a CAFA context, seemingly with no recognition or
analysis that the test for this category of cases may now be different under
CAFA.
To date, only a few of the many decisions that have actually analyzed
the burden-of-proof question while considering whether CAFA changed
the rules have referenced or discussed Section 2 of CAFA with its state-
ment of congressional "Findings and Purposes." Many of these decisions
fail to reference CAFA's legislative history.33 In most decisions where the
courts applied the Complete Diversity Standard, however, overlooking
Section 2 likely was outcome-determinative, especially in those instances
where the court based its ruling in part on its view that no words in
CAFA's text reflected Congress's intent on the burden-of-proof issue.
A. Decisions Applying the Minimal Diversity Standard (While
Discussing, and Following, CAFA's Legislative History)
1. Berry v. American Express Publishing Corp.34
Berry, the first case to decide the burden-of-proof question in keeping
with the legislative history of CAFA by placing the burden on the party
challenging federal jurisdiction, has been followed by a number of other
33. See, e.g., the discussion of Miedema v. Maytag Corp., infra text accompanying notes 235-56.
34. Berry v. Am. Express Publ'g Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
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courts as authoritative on the burden-of-proof issue. In Berry, United
States District Judge Alicemarie H. Stotler examined a California class ac-
tion premised on an alleged unlawful business practice in which credit card
holders were charged for unsolicited magazine subscriptions unless the
cardholders took contrary affirmative action to ensure exclusion.
Judge Stotler stated, "[t]hese new additions to the diversity jurisdiction
statute create various interpretative issues, such as whether the burden of
proof has shifted post-CAFA in favor of federal jurisdiction...36 With no
prior decisions on point to look to for guidance, Judge Stotler undertook
the "difficult task of reconciling previously established, judicially-devel-
oped [sic] principles of diversity jurisdiction with the purpose and structure
of the recent CAFA-amendments to the statute."37 Judge Stotler ex-
pressed some hesitation with statutory interpretation, but noted that legis-
lative history such as "Committee Reports are 'the authoritative source for
finding the Legislature's intent,' and may be consulted as one important
resource in the quest for faithful statutory interpretation."38
Contesting removal under CAFA, the Berry plaintiffs argued that an
examination of the legislative history violated Article Ii, 3 9 to which Judge
Stotler disagreed for two reasons:
First, a statute cannot address all possible outcomes and sit-
uations, and language inevitably contains some imprecision
... . Second, if legislative intent is clearly expressed in
Committee Reports and other materials, judicial disregard
for the explicit and uncontradicted statements contained
therein may result in an interpretation that is wholly incon-
sistent with the statute that the legislature envisioned....
Where both plaintiffs' and defendants' interpretations of the
burden of proof.., are constitutionally permissible, the role
of the Court is to faithfully implement the law as intended
by the Legislature. In these circumstances, the legislative
history is a proper tool of statutory interpretation.
Although the burden of proof is not addressed in either the
text of the original or the text of the new statute, the CAFA
was clearly enacted with the purpose of expanding federal
jurisdiction over class actions.... [quoting from the Senate
Committee Report:] ("The Framers were concerned that
state courts might discriminate against interstate business
35. Id. at 1120.
36. Id. at 1121.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984); accord City of Edmonds v. Wash-
ington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1994)).
39. Id.
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and commercial activities ... both of these concerns-judi-
cial integrity and interstate commerce-are strongly impli-
cated by class actions . . . [thus] class action legislation
expanding federal jurisdiction over class actions would ful-
fill the intention of the Framers") ....
To this end, the Committee Report expresses a clear inten-
tion to place the burden of removal on the party opposing
removal to demonstrate that an interstate class action
should be remanded to state court. The Committee Report
states that "[i]t is the Committee's intention with regard to
each of these exceptions that the party opposing federal ju-
risdiction shall have the burden of demonstrating the appli-
cability of an exemption." . . . "[T]he named plaintiffs
should bear the burden of demonstrating that a case should
be remanded to state court .... 4
The plaintiffs also argued that "the failure to incorporate this directive
on the burden of proof into the statute evinces an explicit intent to main-
tain the status quo ... ." The court, however, disagreed, stating:
[M]ore plausibly, the failure to address the burden of proof
in the statute reflects the Legislature's expectation that the
clear statements in the Senate Report would be sufficient to
shift the burden of proof. The Court notes, with some
irony, that the original diversity statute does not contain any
reference to the burden of proof. Plaintiff fails to explain
how the failure to incorporate the burden of proof in Sec-
tion 1332(d) should be assigned more or less meaning than
the failure to incorporate any burden of proof into the origi-
nal text. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the
failure to explicitly legislate changes on the burden of proof
in interstate class action has little interpretive value.42
Following the conclusion that the burden of proving federal jurisdic-
tion shifted for interstate class actions under CAFA to the plaintiff seeking
remand, the court examined the amount in controversy, and remanded the
action, noting that
Although the Court is aware that the burden is on plaintiffs
to demonstrate that the amount in controversy does not ex-
ceed $5,000,000, the claims in this dispute are so difficult to
value that any monetary valuation could only be wholly
speculative. Accordingly, the court finds that the amount in
40. Id. at 1122 (quoting Sen. Pub. 109-14, at 8, 43-44) (internal citations omitted).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1123.
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controversy, from either the perspective of the class mem-
bers or the defendants, is less than the requisite
$5 ,000,000.
4 3
2. Yeroushalmi v. Blockbuster, Inc.
4 4
On March 4, 2005, Ronit Yeroushalmi filed a complaint in the Supe-
rior Court of Los Angeles County, seeking class certification of issues aris-
ing out of Blockbuster, Inc.'s "No More Late Fees" policy. On April 6,
2005, Blockbuster removed the California class action, claiming minimal-
diversity jurisdiction under CAFA.45 United States District Judge A. How-
ard Matz held that, under CAFA, the federal court had jurisdiction over
the case.46
Judge Matz analyzed the burden-of-proof issue by first noting that
"CAFA is silent as to whether the burdens of proving or disproving re-
moval jurisdiction previously in place when an action is removed pursuant
to § 1332 have changed. ' 47 "The courts previously placed the burden on
the removing defendants to establish jurisdiction. '48 Now, "[i]t is clear that
Congress intended CAFA to undo ... these policies and rules."'49 Judge
Matz also looked to CAFA's legislative history, observing that "[i]n light of
the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, it is proper for the Court to "err"
in favor of inclusion...." 50 The court recognized the shift in the burden of
proof to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had failed to meet that burden:
"plaintiff has not shown that the amount in controversy requirement has
not been met or that it will be limited in any way. Therefore, under CAFA
the Court has jurisdiction."51
3. Waitt v. Merck & Co.52
On July 27, 2005, United States District Judge Robert S. Lasnik, writ-
ing for the Western District of Washington, denied the plaintiff's motion to
remand. The action was filed on April 6, 2005 in King County, Washing-
ton, alleging that Merck had failed to reimburse the plaintiff for the cost of
his unused Vioxx, as promised.53 Merck removed the action to federal
court on minimal-diversity grounds under CAFA.5 4
43. Id. at 1124-25.
44. Yeroushalmi v. Blockbuster, Inc., No. CV 05-225-AHM(RCX), 2005 WL 2083008 (C.D. Cal.
July 11, 2005).
45. Id. at *1.
46. Id. at *6.
47. Id. at *2.
48. Id. at *3 (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at *5.
51. Id.
52. Waitt v. Merck & Co., No. C05-0759L, 2005 WL 1799740 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2005).
53. Id. at *1.
54. Id.
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Waitt moved to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing
that CAFA "does not modify the existing standard for remand because the
statute itself is void of language providing for such modification."55 Merck
countered "that it was Congress' [sic] intent, as evidenced by CAFA's legis-
lative history to place the burden of showing that removal was improper
upon the party moving for remand."56 The court noted that it could not
find any federal case law on point, but conducted its own extensive analysis
using canons of statutory construction.
In cases of statutory construction, the Court's task is to
"interpret the words of the statute in light of the purposes
Congress sought to serve." CAFA, which is codified at vari-
ous places in Title 28 of the United States Code, effects its
relevant changes upon 28 U.S.C. § 1332, colloquially known
as the diversity jurisdiction statute. Regarding these
changes, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated:
"[o]verall, new section 1332(d) is intended to expand sub-
stantially federal court jurisdiction over class actions. Its
provisions should be read broadly, with a strong preference
that interstate class actions should be heard in a federal
court if properly removed by any defendant." That is,
CAFA is designed to permit federal courts to hear more in-
terstate class actions and to relax the barriers facing defend-
ants who seek to remove qualifying class actions to federal
court.
With specific regard to removal and remand, plaintiff
correctly points out that CAFA itself lacks burden-shifting
language. However, notwithstanding the absence of explicit
statutory provisions, it is not difficult to divine Congres-
sional intent from CAFA's legislative history:
Pursuant to new subsection 1332(d)(6), the claims of the
individual class members in any class action shall be ag-
gregated to determine whether the amount in contro-
versy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000 .... The
Committee intends this subsection to be interpreted ex-
pansively. If a purported class action is removed pursu-
ant to these jurisdictional provisions, the named
plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demonstrating
that the removal was improvident (i.e., that the applica-
ble jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied). And if
a federal court is uncertain about whether 'all matters in
controversy' in a purported class action 'do not in the
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court should err in favor of exercising jurisdiction over
the case.
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary also stated:
It is the Committee's intention with regard to each
of these exceptions that the party opposing federal juris-
diction shall have the burden of demonstrating the ap-
plicability of an exemption. Thus, if a plaintiff seeks to
have a class action remanded under section
1332(d)(4)(A) on the ground that the primary defend-
ants and two thirds or more of the class members are
citizens of the home state, that plaintiff shall have the
burden of demonstrating that these criteria are met by
the lawsuit. Similarly, if a plaintiff seeks to have a pur-
ported class action remanded for lack of federal diver-
sity jurisdiction under subsection 1332(d)(5)(B) ... that
plaintiff should have the burden of demonstrating that
'all matters in controversy' do not 'in the aggregate ex-
ceed the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest
and costs' or that 'the number of all proposed plaintiff
classes in the aggregate is less than 100.' ...
[I]t is the intent of the Committee that the named
plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demonstrating
that a case should be remanded to state court (e.g., the
burden of demonstrating that more than two-thirds of
the proposed class members are citizens of the forum
state).
Based on the foregoing legislative history, the Court holds
that Merck's reading of CAFA is the correct one and that it
is plaintiff's responsibility to demonstrate that removal from
state court was improvident.57
Judge Lasnik then denied Waitt's motion to remand, finding that he, as
the party challenging minimal-diversity jurisdiction, had not met his burden
of proving that the court did not have jurisdiction over the case. Waitt also
argued that his damages did not meet the $5,000,000 requirement, but
Judge Lasnik noted that the "plaintiff's reply fails to include any of the
economic damages suffered by the nationwide class he purportedly repre-
sents and similarly fails to mention that his complaint requests treble and/
or punitive damages."58
57. Id. at *1-2 (internal citations omitted).
58. Id. at *2.
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4. In re Textainer Partnership59
United States District Judge Maxine M. Chesney remanded a Califor-
nia class action from the Northern District of California on July 27, 2005,
holding that CAFA did not apply because the action was covered by an
exception in CAFA relating to corporate governance suits. 60 As part of
Judge Chesney's Order Granting Motion to Remand, she discussed the bur-
den-of-proof issue, explaining:
While courts ordinarily are required to "strictly construe [a]
removal statute against removal jurisdiction," rejecting ju-
risdiction "if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in
the first instance," the legislative history of CAFA instructs
that CAFA's jurisdictional provisions "should be read
broadly, with a strong preference that interstate class ac-
tions should be heard in a Federal court if removed by any
defendant." "[I]f a Federal court is uncertain ... the court
should err in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the case."
Similarly, while the defendant ordinarily bears the bur-
den of proving that removal was proper, CAFA's legislative
history indicates that the plaintiff has the burden of proving
that an action removed under CAFA should be remanded.
"If a purported class action is removed pursuant to these
jurisdictional provisions ... it is the intent of the Committee
that the named plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of dem-
onstrating that a case should be remanded to state court.,
61
5. Natale v. Pfizer62
On July 28, 2005, United States District Court Chief Judge William G.
Young, writing for the District Court of Massachusetts, analyzed a class
action removed prior to enactment of CAFA and noted as part of his
analysis:
Under the Act, the burden of removal is on the party oppos-
ing removal to prove that remand is appropriate. [W]ith re-
spect to the Act, "the Committee Report expresses a clear
intention to place the burden of removal on the party op-
posing removal to demonstrate that an interstate class ac-
tion should be remanded to state court." . . . "It is the
59. In re Textainer P'ship, No. C 05-0969 MMC, 2005 WL 1791559 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2005).
60. Section 5 of CAFA, codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d)(2), provides an exception to removal of
CAFA-based class actions for "a claim that relates to the internal affairs or governance of a corporation
or other form of business enterprise and arises under or by virtue of the laws of the state in which such
corporation or business enterprise is incorporated or organized."
61. Textainer, 2005 WL 1791559, at *3 (internal citations omitted).
62. Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Mass. 2005).
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Committee's intention with regard to each of these excep-
tions that the party opposing federal jurisdiction shall have
the burden of demonstrating the applicability of an exemp-
tion." ... "The named plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of
demonstrating that a case should be remanded to state
court. "63
Chief Judge Young then continued by stating that "[t]he amendments
and expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction, including the expansion of
removal of state actions, are '[t]he most publicized changes associated with
the ... Act.' ,64 The Natale opinion also contains an in-depth analysis of
CAFA and the cases to date interpreting the "date of commencement" is-
sue for CAFA-removal purposes. The court held, in line with the develop-
ing case law,6 5 that "a case is 'commenced' for purposes of the Class Action
Fairness Act when it is filed with the state court."' 66 However, the court
chose not to remand the case, but rather to certify the question to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.67
6. Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.
68
On September 8, 2005, United States District Judge Anna J. Brown
remanded an Oregon class action removed from state court because the
action was commenced on February 14, 2005, four days before CAFA's
effective date. Judge Brown did, however, consider the burden-of-proof
issue in her opinion:
The court ordinarily is required to "strictly construe [a] re-
moval statute against removal jurisdiction" and reject juris-
diction "if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in
the first instance." The legislative history of CAFA, how-
ever, "instructs that CAFA's jurisdictional provisions
'should be read broadly, with a strong preference that inter-
state class actions should be heard in a Federal court if re-
moved by any defendant."'
In addition, although the removing defendant ordina-
rily bears the burden of proving that removal was proper,
"CAFA's legislative history indicates.., the plaintiff has the
burden of proving . ..an action removed under CAFA
63. Id. at 168 (quoting the Senate Committee Report) (internal citations omitted). The judge
noted that the Berry opinion was not signed or dated by the court. Id. at 168 n.10.
64. Id. (internal citations omitted).
65. See supra note 19.
66. Natale, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 183.
67. Id. The First Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the District Court of Massachusetts in
its remand decision, but did not address the burden-of-proof analysis, as that issue was not included in
the question of law certified to the First Circuit. See Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 424 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2005).
68. Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-768-BR, 2005 WL 2211094 (D. Or. Sept. 8,
2005).
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should be remanded." "If a purported class action is re-
moved pursuant to these jurisdictional provisions, . . .it is
the intent of the Committee that the named plaintiff(s)
should bear the burden of demonstrating that a case should
be remanded to state court." "It is plaintiff's responsibility
to demonstrate that removal from state court was
improvident. '"69
7. Dinkel v. General Motors Corp.7"
On November 9, 2005, United States District Judge D. Brock Hornby
denied a motion to remand a class action filed in a Kansas state court and
consolidated in the District Court of Maine by the Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation.7' The court determined that, under the Kansas Rules
of Civil Procedure, the action commenced as to the defendants that were
not served within ninety days of filing of the complaint at the moment they
were served.72 The court stated, "Dinkel did not serve the Removing De-
fendants within the ninety days. As to them, the Kansas lawsuit was not
'commenced' until they were actually served . .. which was after the effec-
tive date of CAFA. For them 'a new window of removal' was opened.
73
Judge Hornby held that Dinkel could not "unring the bell" by dismissing
the removed defendants to attempt to return the lawsuit to its status on
February 17, 2005, before CAFA's enactment date.74
As to the burden-of-proof issue, Judge Hornby stated:
My conclusion flows from CAFA's plain language and re-
moval principles generally. But CAFA's legislative history
also strongly supports it. As stated in the Senate Report on
CAFA:
The law is clear that, once a federal court properly has
jurisdiction over a case removed to federal court, subse-
quent events generally cannot "oust" the federal court
of jurisdiction. While plaintiffs undoubtedly possess
some power to seek to avoid federal jurisdiction by de-
fining a proposed class in particular ways, they lose that
power once a defendant has properly removed a class
action to federal court.
Moreover, new section 1332(d) is intended to expand sub-
stantially federal court jurisdiction over class actions. Its
69. Id. at *1 (quoting from both House and Senate legislative histories) (internal citations
omitted).
70. Dinkel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 2d 289 (D. Me. 2005).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 292.
73. Id. at 293 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d
805, 807 (7th Cir. 2005)).
74. Id. at 294.
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provisions [according to the Senate Report] should be read
broadly, with a strong preference that interstate class actions
should be heard in federal court if properly removed by any
defendant. [F]ederal courts should "err in favor of exercis-
ing jurisdiction." "[I]f a Federal court is uncertain .. .the
court should err in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the
case." According to the Report, "The Committee intends
this subsection to be interpreted expansively. If a purported
class action is removed pursuant to these jurisdictional provi-
sions, the named plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of dem-
onstrating that the removal was improvident (i.e., that the
applicable jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied").
75
B. Decisions Mechanically Applying the Complete Diversity Standard
(Without Discussing CAFA's Legislative History)
1. In re Expedia Hotel Taxes and Fees Litigation
76
On April 15, 2005, the Western District of Washington, in an Order by
United States District Judge John C. Coughenour, held that this class ac-
tion filed prior to February 18, 2005, but consolidated after that date, could
not be removed under CAFA.77 However, in looking at the burden-of-
proof issue, Judge Coughenour simply referenced the Complete Diversity
Standard: "The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party
seeking removal, and the removal statute is strictly construed against re-
moval jurisdiction. ' 78 The court did not consider in its ruling the differ-
ences between complete and minimal diversity and did not examine the
language of Section 2 of CAFA or its legislative history, but instead
mechanically applied the traditional burden of proof to the party invoking
federal jurisdiction in a complete-diversity setting.
2. Awaida v. Pfizer, Inc.7 9
On June 7, 2005, Judge Lee R. West, United States District Judge for
the Western District of Oklahoma, denied a plaintiff's motion to remand a
class action filed on February 18, 2005.80 The plaintiff filed on CAFA's
effective date in the District Court of Canadian County, Oklahoma, and
Pfizer timely removed to federal court, alleging federal subject matter juris-
diction under Title 28 Section 1332, asserting both complete- and minimal-
diversity jurisdiction under CAFA.81 In his motion to remand, Awaida
75. Id. at 294-95 (internal citations omitted).
76. In re Expedia Hotel Taxes and Fees Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 904 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 905 (quoting Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix, Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1999)).
79. Awaida v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ-05-425-W (W.D. Okla. June 7, 2005) (not available on
Westlaw or LexisNexis).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1.
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"contended that because congressional legislation does not become law un-
til the precise moment it is approved by the executive branch.., the Act
was not in effect at the time this lawsuit was filed."82 Judge West held
CAFA applicable because it states that it "shall apply to any civil action
commenced on or after the date of [its] enactment.
83
Judge West briefly considered the burden-of-proof issue and mechani-
cally applied the Complete Diversity Standard, stating that "[o]nce the is-
sue of jurisdiction has been raised, the party seeking to invoke this Court's
subject matter jurisdiction 'bear[s] the burden of establishing that the re-
quirements for the exercise of diversity jurisdiction are present.' In this
case, the burden falls upon Pfizer. '"84 The court did not, however, sepa-
rately consider the burden-of-proof issue under CAFA, nor did it address
Section 2 of CAFA or its legislative history. The court did, however, deny
the motion to remand, finding that minimal-diversity and the amount-in-
controversy requirements under CAFA had been established.85
3. Sneddon v. Hotwire, Inc.86
On June 29, 2005, United States District Judge Susan Illston issued an
opinion examining CAFA's date of "commencement" issue. The judge re-
manded the class action against defendant Hotwire, Inc., filed in the Supe-
rior Court for the County of San Francisco, California, on January 10,
2005.87 The opinion did not analyze the burden of proof under CAFA, but
merely noted in passing that "[t]he court may remand sua sponte or on
motion of a party, and the party who invoked the federal court's removal
jurisdiction has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction."88
C. Decisions Applying the Complete Diversity Standard (While
Discussing, but Rejecting, CAFA's Legislative History)
1. Schwartz v. Comcast Corp.89
In this case, "[p]laintiff Adam Schwartz[ ] filed a class action complaint
on April 18, 2005 in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas for Philadel-
phia County alleging that defendant, Comcast Corporation, breached its
contract with plaintiff, was unjustly enriched, and violated Pennsylvania's
82. Id. at 2.
83. Id. (quoting 119 Stat. 4, 114) (the Supreme Court has held that with such language
"[f]ractions of the day are not recognized." (quoting Lapeyre v. United States, 84 U.S. 191, 198
(1872))).
84. Id. at 5 (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 1284, 1290 (10th Cir. 2001)).
85. Id.
86. Sneddon v. Hotwire, Inc., No. C 05-0951 SI, C 05-0952 SI, C 05-0953-SI, 2005 WL 1593593
(N.D. Cal. June 29, 2005).
87. Id.
88. Id. at *1 (citing Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing
Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921)); Salveson v. W. States Bankcard Ass'n, 525
F. Supp. 566, 571 (N.D. Cal. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part, 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984);
SCHWARZER, TASHIMA, & WAGSTAFFE, FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL, 2:1093 (1992)).
89. Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., No. Civ.A. 05-2340, 2005 WL 1799414 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2005).
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Consumer Protection Law .. ."9 Schwartz alleged specifically that Com-
cast had violated the company's promise to provide "service that was al-
ways on, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year." 91 Comcast, a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania,
filed its notice of removal, asserting minimal diversity under CAFA.
Schwartz moved to remand.92
Comcast argued that the class included citizens of other states that
were "merely doing business in Pennsylvania or temporarily residing in
Pennsylvania," and that therefore the minimal-diversity-of-citizenship re-
quirements were met under CAFA.93 Schwartz then filed an amended
complaint, attempting to limit his original complaint to citizens of the state
of Pennsylvania. Comcast asserted that "CAFA's legislative history dem-
onstrates Congress's intent to alter this rule and place the burden of proof
with respect to jurisdiction on a remanding plaintiff."'94 Comcast cited the
Judiciary Committee's section-by-section analysis from the committee's re-
port in which it states:
Overall, new section 1332 is intended to expand substan-
tially federal court jurisdiction over class actions. Its provi-
sions should be read broadly, with a strong preference that
interstate class actions should be heard in a federal court if
properly removed by any defendant.
As noted above, it is the intent of the Committee that the
named plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demonstrating
that a case should bear the burden of demonstrating that a
case should [sic] be remanded to state court (e.g., the bur-
den of demonstrating that more than two-thirds of the pro-
posed class members are citizens of the forum state).
Allocating the burden in this manner is important to ensure
that the named plaintiffs will not be able to evade federal
jurisdiction with vague class definitions or other efforts to
obscure the citizenship of class members. The law is clear
that, once a federal court properly has jurisdiction over a
case removed to federal court, subsequent events generally
cannot "oust" the federal court of jurisdiction. While plain-
tiffs undoubtedly possess some power to seek to avoid fed-
eral jurisdiction by defining a proper class in particular
ways, they lose that power once a defendant has properly
removed a class action to federal court.
90. Id. at *1.
91. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
92. Id.
93. Id. at *2 (internal quotations omitted).
94. Id. at *4.
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It is the Committee's intention with regard to each of these
exceptions that the party opposing federal jurisdiction shall
have the burden of demonstrating the applicability of an ex-
emption. Thus, if a plaintiff seeks to have a class action re-
manded under section 1332(d)(4)(A) on the ground that the
primary defendants and two-thirds or more of the class
members are citizens of the home state, that plaintiff shall
have the burden of demonstrating that these criteria are met
by the lawsuit.95
Comcast also cited Berry v. American Express Publishing Corp.96 in
support of its arguments that the jurisdictional burden of proof under
CAFA is on the party opposing removal. Judge O'Neil conducted an ex-
tensive analysis of the Berry opinion, writing:
In Berry, Judge Stotler interpreted CAFA's legislative his-
tory-specifically the Judiciary Committee Report-to hold
that CAFA has shifted the burden of proof to the party
seeking remand. Acknowledging that "determining legisla-
tive 'intent' is a process not without the potential for selec-
tive interpretation, where the statute does not squarely
address the issue," Judge Stotler determined that "legisla-
tive history is an essential tool for statutory interpretation."
Finding support in the Supreme Court's opinion in Garcia v.
United States and an opinion from the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in City of Edmonds v. Wash. State Bldg.
Code Council, Judge Stotler held that the [Judiciary Com-
mittee Report is] "'the authoritative source for finding the
Legislature's intent,' and may be consulted as one important
resource in the quest for faithful statutory interpretation."
In support of this conclusion, Judge Stotler added:
First, a statute cannot address all possible outcomes
and situations, and language inevitably contains some im-
precision; where the text does not provide a clear answer, a
faithful interpretation of the statute necessarily involves
more than the text itself. Second, if legislative intent is
clearly expressed in Committee Reports and other materi-
als, judicial disregard for the explicit and uncontradicted
statements contained therein may result in an interpretation
95. Id. at *4 (internal citations omitted) (quoting the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, S.
Rep. No. 109-14, at 42-44 (2005)). These sentiments were echoed by Representative Sensenbrenner,
151 Cong. Rec. H727-730, and Representative Goodlatte, id. at H732, in the House of Representatives.
96. Berry v. Am. Express Publ'g Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (discussed supra
text accompanying notes 34-43).
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that is wholly inconsistent with the statute that the legisla-
ture envisioned. Where the source of legal authority is stat-
utory and not constitutional, such as with the diversity
statute, Congress retains the ability to create and direct the
law, so long as it is consistent with constitutional principles,
and it is particularly important for the Court to follow that
directive. Where both plaintiffs' and defendants' interpreta-
tions of the burden of proof... are constitutionally permis-
sible, the role of the Court is to faithfully implement the law
as intended by the Legislature. In these circumstances
the legislative history is a proper tool of statutory
interpretation.
With this statutory interpretation framework in place,
Judge Stotler found that "the Committee Report expresses
a clear intention to place the burden of removal [sic] on the
party opposing removal to demonstrate that an interstate
class action should be remanded to state court." Rejecting
plaintiffs' arguments "that the failure to incorporate this di-
rective evinces an explicit intent to maintain the status quo,"
Judge Stotler held that "this contention cannot be squared
with the uncontradicted statements contained in the Com-
mittee Report." Judge Stotler further opined:
Although the lack of any burden-shifting provisions
may be an opaque means of preserving the status quo... it
is equally possible that it was due to legislative oversight,
the inability of the Legislature to foresee, or for statutes to
address all circumstances. Alternatively, and more plausi-
bly, the failure to address the burden of proof in the statute
reflects the Legislature's expectation that the clear state-
ments in the Senate Report would be sufficient to shift the
burden of proof. The Court notes, with some irony, that the
original diversity statute does not contain any reference to
the burden of proof. Plaintiff fails to explain how the failure
to incorporate the burden of proof in Section 1332(d)
should be assigned more or less meaning than the failure to
incorporate any burden of proof in the original text.
Judge Stotler thus concluded that "the failure to explic-
itly legislate changes on the burden of proof in interstate
class actions has little interpretive value." Judge Stotler also
observed "that her interpretation is consistent with the tra-
dition of placing the burden on the moving party."9
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Judge O'Neil disagreed, however, with Judge Stotler's analysis in
Berry, and pointed to "Justice Jackson's concurrence in Schwegmann Bros.:
'Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face of the Act is
inescapably ambiguous."' 98 He further noted that "[w]here the statutory
language is plain and unambiguous, further inquiry is not required, except
in the extraordinary case where a literal reading of the language produces
an absurd result."99 Judge O'Neil found neither ambiguity in section
1332(d) nor absurdity in its result, "because it is consistent with courts' long
standing application of the burden of proof for establishing diversity juris-
diction."1 ° However, in looking solely at new section 1332(d), Judge
O'Neil overlooked the specific congressional intent expressed in the text of
Section 2 of CAFA.
Judge O'Neil also considered a number of Supreme Court cases, not-
ing that "Congress is presumed to be aware of existing law when it passes
legislation." 10 1 In contrast to Judge Stotler, Judge O'Neil concluded that
he could not "assume that, with the Judiciary Committee's understanding
of the operation of diversity jurisdiction, Congress was unaware that courts
have uniformly placed the burden of proof on a removing defendant.
10 2
Judge O'Neil found that "a court may depart from the plain language
of a statute only by an extraordinary showing of a contrary congressional
intent in the legislative history."' 3 Instead of following Judge Stotler,
Judge O'Neil held that
with a plain, nonabsurd construction of a statute in view, I
need not construe this statute in a manner that would en-
large its meaning "so that what was omitted, presumably by
inadvertence, may be included within its scope." I am,
therefore, hesitant to read into the statute a Congressional
intent to shift the longstanding burden of proof for estab-
lishing diversity jurisdiction, where Congress expressly en-
acted numerous other intended changes discussed by the
Judiciary Committee in its Report to the exclusion of the
change with respect to the burden of proof.' °4
98. Id. at *6 (citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 77 (1984) (quoting Schwegmann Bros. v.
Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-96 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). See also In re First
Merch. Acceptance Corp., 198 F.3d 394, 402 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Supreme Court cases declaring that clear
[statutory] language cannot be overcome by contrary legislative history are legion.")).




103. Id. at *7 (quoting Idahoan Fresh, 157 F.3d at 202) (citing Garcia, 469 U.S. at 75)).
104. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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By "failing to express a concomitant change in the burden of proof, Con-
gress implicitly acknowledged and adopted the longstanding rule that a re-
moving defendant bears the burden of proof for establishing diversity
jurisdiction.
10 5
Judge O'Neil concluded his analysis of statutory interpretation by
holding:
Had Congress intended to make a change in the law with
respect to the burden of proof, it would have done so ex-
pressly in the statute. "If Congress enacted into law some-
thing different from what it intended, then it should amend
the statute to conform it to its intent. It is beyond our prov-
ince to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to pro-
vide for what we might think is the preferred result." I
therefore hold that, notwithstanding its legislative history,
CAFA does not shift the burden of proof from a removing
defendant to a remanding plaintiff.1" 6
2. Moll v. Allstate Floridian Insurance Co.1°7
In Moll v. Allstate Floridian, United States Senior District Judge
Roger Vinson, writing for the Northern District of Florida, granted the
plaintiffs' motion to remand.'018 The plaintiffs asserted claims of breach of
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith, based on All-
state Floridian's alleged intentional underestimation of claims related to
hurricanes in Florida during 2004.109 The plaintiffs filed the action in Flor-
ida state court, and Allstate Floridian removed the action to the District
Court of the Northern District of Florida on minimal-diversity jurisdiction
grounds.110
On the plaintiffs' motion for remand, the court placed the burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction squarely on Allstate Floridian (AFIC),
stating that "AFIC, as the party removing this action to federal court, has
the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.""' The court ultimately
held that Allstate Floridian bore the burden of proving federal jurisdiction
"[b]ecause the removal statutes are strictly construed against removal [and]
all doubts about removal must be resolved in favor of remand.""1
12
105. Id.
106. Id. (internal citations omitted).
107. Moll v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., No. 3:05CV16ORVMD, 2005 WL 2007104 (N.D. Fla. Aug.
16, 2005).
108. Id.
109. Id. at *1-2.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *2 (citing Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005))
(citing McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002)).
112. Id. (citing Sweet Pea Marine, 411 F.3d 1242; McCormick, 293 F.3d 1254; Burns v. Windsor Ins.
Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994)).
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The court explained that "the sole basis for federal subject matter ju-
risdiction in this case is premised upon diversity of citizenship as set forth
in Title 28, United States Code, Section 1332, and as amended by the Class
Action Fairness Act." '113 The court did acknowledge in a footnote, how-
ever, that "CAFA was undoubtedly intended to expand federal diversity
jurisdiction over multi-state actions. However, the CAFA still incorporates
the corporate citizenship requirements of Title 28, United States Code,
Section 1332(c)(1), and it preserves state courts' jurisdiction over class ac-
tions that predominantly involve plaintiffs and defendants in the same
state." '114
The court determined that the defendants seeking removal satisfied
CAFA's $5,000,000 amount-in-controversy requirement, but that they
failed to prove that diversity jurisdiction existed, since Allstate Floridian's
principal place of business was in Florida.
115
3. Judy v. Pfizer, Inc.116
On September 14, 2005, U.S. District Judge Rodney W. Sipple of the
Eastern District of Missouri held that CAFA does not apply to a petition
amended post-CAFA to assert new claims for relief." 7 Pfizer had previ-
ously removed the litigation on other grounds prior to enactment of
CAFA, but the case was remanded when Judge Sipple found no federal
question or complete-diversity jurisdiction. 8 Thereafter, Elizabeth Judy,
the plaintiff, filed her amended petition on July 22, 2005, several months
after CAFA's enactment date, to refine the factual allegations and to assert
additional common-law claims for relief surrounding the prescription drug
Neurontin 19 Pfizer again removed, this time on minimal-diversity
grounds under CAFA based on the amended complaint, in an attempt to
consolidate multi-district litigation involving Neurontin1 20 The court fol-
lowed Knudsen v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,1 21 holding that the
amendment of the state court action did not "commence" a new action in
the state court, and remanded the case.
122
Judge Sipple, in examining Pfizer's arguments that the burden of proof
fell on plaintiffs, stated:
Pfizer asserts that the CAFA places the burden of proof in
support of remand upon Judy. Settled case law regarding
removal, however, places the burden of proof on the party
invoking federal jurisdiction, Pfizer in this matter. Pfizer's
113. Id. at *3-4.
114. Id. at *1 n.1.
115. Id. at *13-14.
116. Judy v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:05CV1208RWS, 2005 WL 2240088 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 14, 2005).
117. Id.
118. Id. at *1.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805, 806 (7th Cir. 2005).
122. Judy, 2005 WL 2240088, at *3.
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argument turns this settled case law on its head. In support
of shifting the burden of proof to Judy, Pfizer cites to four
district court cases, three from California and one from
Washington. These cases hold that, although the CAFA is
silent about the burden of proof in cases removed under the
Act, a [Senate] Committee Report contemplates the shifting
of the burden to the plaintiff seeking remand.123
Judge Sipple began his analysis by noting that "[a]t the time of the
enactment of the CAFA, Congress was presumed to be aware of the well
settled case law regarding the burden of proof in removed actions., 124 Us-
ing that general concept as his cornerstone, Judge Sipple continued his stat-
utory interpretation: "A court may resort to legislative history to interpret
a statute when it contains an ambiguity. Absent some ambiguity in the
statute, there is no occasion to look to legislative history.' 1 25 Judge Sipple
concluded:
The omission of a burden of proof standard in the CAFA
does not create an ambiguity inviting courts to scour its leg-
islative history to decide the point. By failing to specifically
address the burden of proof in the Act, especially in light of
discussing the issue in a Committee Report, Congress is
deemed to have not intended to change the settled case law
on that issue. Had Congress wished to change which party
bears the burden of proof in a removal action under the
CAFA, it could have explicitly done so.
As a District Court Judge, I am compelled to follow the pre-
cedent of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals which places
the burden on the party seeking removal. Moreover, the
burden of proof issue in this case is not a decisive issue be-
cause my determination of whether Judy's amendment of
her petition commenced a new case for purposes of removal
under the CAFA can be resolved by simply viewing her
original and amended state court petitions.
126
4. Plummer v. Farmers Group, Inc.
127
On September 15, 2005, United States District Judge Ronald A.
White, writing for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, denied plaintiff's mo-
tion to remand, holding that an amended complaint adding a request for
123. Id. at *1 (internal citations omitted).
124. Id. at *2 (citing Contract Freighters, Inc. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Transp., 260 F.3d 858, 861
(8th Cir. 2001) (Congress is presumed to know the legal background in which it is legislating)).
125. Id. (citing Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1032 (8th Cir. 2003)).
126. Id.
127. Plummer v. Farmers Group, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (E.D. Okla. 2005).
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class certification constituted "commencement" under CAFA.1 28  The
plaintiff originally filed the suit on August 15, 2003, as a single-plaintiff case
concerning an automobile insurance policy and an insurance company
computer program that allegedly undervalued her automobile. 129 Plummer
amended her complaint on May 23, 2005, seeking class certification under
Oklahoma law. 130 Farmer's Group then removed the case to federal court,
claiming minimal-diversity jurisdiction under CAFA. 1 3 1 The court ex-
amined both the date of commencement issue and the amount in contro-
versy. As to the date of commencement, the court agreed with the Seventh
Circuit in Knudsen v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 132 that the amended
complaint did not relate back and was the equivalent of filing a new cause
of action. 33
As part of the court's consideration of the amount-in-controversy is-
sue, it looked to the burden-of-proof question raised by the defendants.
Judge White began by acknowledging the Complete Diversity Standard:
"Typically, the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of dem-
onstrating it exists.
'"1 34
Several courts have held that it is the intent of Congress that
"if a purported class action is removed pursuant to [CAFA],
the named plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demon-
strating that the removal was improvident." This Court
agrees this view better comports with the purpose of CAFA.
This Court is not, however, sanguine about the reliance by
these courts on CAFA's legislative history rather than the
precise language of the statute itself.'
35
The plaintiff, on the other hand, cited Schwartz v. Comcast Corp. 36 for two
propositions: first, that "Congress implicitly acknowledged and adopted the
longstanding rule that a removing defendant bears the burden of proof for
establishing diversity jurisdiction,"' 37 and second, "[h]ad Congress in-
tended to make a change in the law with respect to the burden of proof, it
would have done so expressly in the statute .... It is beyond our province
to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we
might think is the preferred result." '138
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1312.
130. Id. at 1313.
131. Id.
132. Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805, 808 (7th Cir. 2005).
133. Plummer, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 1316.
134. Id. at 1317 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)).
135. Id. (quoting Waitt v. Merck & Co., No. C05-0759L, 2005 WL 1799740, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July
27, 2005); Harvey v. Blockbuster, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 749, 752 (D.N.J. 2005); In re Textainer P'ship,
No. C 05-0969 MMC, 2005 WL 1791559, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2005).
136. Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., No. Civ.A. 05-2340, 2005 WL 1799414 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2005).
137. Plummer, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 1316 (quoting Schwartz, 2005 WL 1799414, at *7).
138. Id.
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Judge White, without acknowledging the existence of Section 2 of
CAFA and its clear statement of congressional intent behind its passage of
CAFA, held:
While the Court does not necessarily agree that Congress's
failure to "expressly" modify the law with respect to the
burden of proof constitutes an implicit adoption of the
traditional rule, the Court agrees that it is not the role of the
judiciary to correct drafting errors. The Tenth Circuit has
stated that the removing party, at a minimum, has the bur-
den to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
jurisdictional amount has been satisfied. This showing must
be evident from the face of the petition or the notice of re-
moval itself. While the purpose of CAFA may arguably mil-
itate in favor of reversing this burden, Congress did not
expressly say so in the statute. This Court is loath to ignore
the long-standing precedent of this Circuit on the ethereal
basis of Congressional intent unstated in the actual language
of the law. Therefore, the Court will not reverse the burden
of proof on this issue. 39
5. Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.14
On October 20, 2005, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit court
to examine the burden-of-proof issue under CAFA. 4 1 Circuit Judges Pos-
ner, Easterbrook, and Rovner considered the decision of the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois written by United States District Judge John W. Darrah.'42
The District Court remanded an Illinois class action removed on minimal-
diversity grounds under CAFA, finding that the Telephone Consumer Pro-
tection Act provides exclusive state court jurisdiction over its private
causes of action. 43 Judge Darrah's opinion included a statement regarding
the burden of proof in a complete-diversity context: "The party seeking to
preserve the removal, not the party moving to remand, bears the burden of
establishing that the court has jurisdiction." '144
Countrywide filed an appeal under CAFA, which provides for review
of remand orders, 45 and the Brill court summarily reversed the District
Court's decision, without full briefing or argument by the parties.146 The
139. Id. at 1317-18 (internal citations omitted).
140. Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005).
141. Id.
142. Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 05 C 2713, 2005 WL 2230193 (N.D. Il. Sept. 8,
2005).
143. Id. at *2.
144. Id. at *1 (citing Jones v. Gen. Tire and Rubber Co., 514 F.2d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 1976)).
145. 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1).
146. Brill, 427 F.3d at 447.
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Brill court did not, however, reverse the District Court's observations re-
garding the burden of proof. Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court,
explained:
Countrywide maintains that the Class Action Fairness Act
reassigns that burden to the proponent of remand. It does
not rely on any of the Act's language, for none is even ar-
guably relevant. Instead it points to this language in the re-
port of the Senate Judiciary Committee: "If a purported
class action is removed pursuant to these jurisdictional pro-
visions, the named plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of
demonstrating that the removal was improvident (i.e., that
the applicable jurisdictional provisions are not satisfied)."
This passage does not concern any text in the bill that even-
tually became law. When a law sensibly could be read in
multiple ways, legislative history may help a court under-
stand which of these received the political branches' impri-
matur. But when the legislative history stands by itself, as a
naked expression of "intent" unconnected to any enacted
text, it has no more force than an opinion poll of legisla-
tors-less, really, as it speaks for fewer. Thirteen Senators
signed this report and five voted not to send the proposal to
the floor. Another 82 Senators did not express themselves
on the question; likewise 435 Members of the House and
one President kept their silence.
We recognize that a dozen or so district judges have
treated this passage as equivalent to a statute and reas-
signed the risk of non-persuasion accordingly. But naked
legislative history has no legal effect, as the Supreme Court
held in Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566-68 . . .
(1988). A Committee of Congress attempted to alter an es-
tablished legal rule by a forceful declaration in a report; the
Justices concluded, however, that because the declaration
did not correspond to any new statutory language that
would change the rule, it was ineffectual. Just so here. The
rule that the proponent of federal jurisdiction bears the risk
of non-persuasion has been around for a long time. To
change such a rule, Congress must enact a statute with the
President's signature (or by a two-thirds majority to over-
ride a veto). A declaration by 13 Senators will not serve.147
Nowhere in its analysis of the burden-of-proof issue did the Brill court
reference or otherwise indicate that it was aware of CAFA's "Findings and
Purposes" in Section 2, which text reveals that CAFA's legislative history is
147. Id. at 448 (some internal citations omitted).
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not a "naked expression of 'intent' unconnected to any enacted text." The
Brill court further did not apply the correct canon of statutory construc-
tion. 148 The court, nevertheless, concluded that even under the Complete
Diversity Standard, Countrywide had satisfied the minimum jurisdictional
requirement of $5,000,000 in controversy, and remanded to the district
court for a decision on the merits.
149
6. Ongstad v. Piper Jaffray & Co. 0
On January 4, 2006, United States District Judge Daniel L. Hovland,
writing for the District Court of North Dakota, examined a class action
filed on September 29, 2005 that was removed on minimal-diversity
grounds pursuant to CAFA.151 The action alleged that Piper Jaffray, a se-
curities broker and investment banking firm, traded securities without au-
thorization, resulting in a loss. 152 Judge Hovland examined the burden-of-
proof arguments and the amount-in-controversy requirement. The court
placed the jurisdictional burden of proof on Piper Jaffray as the removing
party and held that it could not demonstrate the requisite amount in con-
troversy as required by CAFA. 15 3
In his examination of the burden-of-proof issue, Judge Hovland out-
lined the jurisprudence of the Complete Diversity Standard within the
Eighth Circuit and the disagreement among the courts on this issue in the
CAFA context, concluding, "[r]emoval statutes are strictly construed in
favor of state court jurisdiction and federal district courts must resolve all
doubts concerning removal in favor of remand. The removing party bears
the burden of showing that removal was proper.,1 54 The court acknowl-
edged that some courts have held that CAFA shifts the burden of proof to
the party seeking remand, and pointed to the legislative history of CAFA
in doing so. 5 5 The court also stated that other courts have determined that
"CAFA does nothing to alter the traditional rule of law that the party op-
posing remand bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction." '156
148. See discussion of the correct approach infra Section V.A.
149. Brill, 427 F.3d at 452.
150. Ongstad v. Piper Jaffray & Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (D.N.D. 2006).
151. Id. at 1085.
152. Id. at 1086.
153. Id. at 1092-93.
154. Id. at 1087-88 (citing In re Bus. Men's Assurance Co. of Am., 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir.
1993); see also Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590, 595 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Bus. Men's Assur-
ance, 992 F.2d at 183) (the party opposing remand has the burden of establishing federal subject-matter
jurisdiction)).
155. Id. at 1088 (citing Harvey v. Blockbuster, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 749, 752 (D.N.J. 2005); In re
Textainer P'ship, No. C 05-0969 MMC, 2005 WL 1791559, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2005); Waitt v.
Merck & Co., No. C05-0759L, 2005 WL 1799740, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2005); Yeroushalmi v.
Blockbuster, Inc., No. CV 05-225-AHM(RCX), 2005 WL 2083008, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2005); Berry
v. Am. Express Publ'g Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1122-23 (C.D. Cal. 2005)).
156. Ongstad, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1088 (citing Plummer v. Farmers Group, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d
1310, 1317-18 (E.D. Okla. 2005); Judy v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:05CV1208RWS, 2005 WL 2240088, at *2
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 14, 2005); Schwartz v. Comcast, Corp., No. Civ.A. 05-2340, 2005 WL 1799414, at *4
(E.D. Pa. July 28, 2005); In re Expedia Hotel Taxes and Fees Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 904, 905 (W.D.
Wash. 2005); Sneddon v. Hotwire, Inc., No. C 05-0951 SI, C 05-0952 SI, C 05-0953 SI, 2005 WL 1593593,
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Observing that "the United States Supreme Court and the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals have not yet addressed this issue, ' 15 7 Judge Hovland
began a step-by-step approach with his reasoning, but like the Brill court,
apparently overlooked Congress's "Findings and Purposes" in Section 2 of
the Act: "At the time of the enactment of the CAFA, Congress was pre-
sumed to be aware of the well settled case law regarding the burden of
proof in removed actions. '15' The court also acknowledged that legislative
history may be considered to interpret a statute when the statute contains
an ambiguity, but absent some ambiguity in the statute, there is no occasion
to look to the legislative history.
159
Following the road taken in Brill, Judge Hovland concluded that "[t]he
omission of a burden of proof standard in the CAFA does not create an
ambiguity inviting courts to scour its legislative history to decide the point.
By failing to specifically address the burden of proof in the Act, especially
in light of discussing the issue in a Committee Report, Congress is deemed
to have not intended to change the settled case law on that issue. Had
Congress wished to change which party bears the burden of proof in a re-
moval action under the CAFA it could have explicitly done so."16' Judge
Hovland then cited Brill at length in discounting the authoritative value of
CAFA's legislative history, and held that "[t]his Court is persuaded by the
holdings in Judy and Brill. The Court will decline Piper Jaffray's invitation
to break from the well-established rule of law that the removing party
bears the burden of establishing federal subject-matter jurisdiction. There
is simply nothing in CAFA that contemplates such a change.
' '161
7. Rogers v. Central Locating Service Ltd.
1 62
On February 1, 2006, United States District Judge John C. Coughe-
nour of the Western District of Washington remanded a wage-and-hour
action back to Washington state court that had been removed pursuant to
CAFA. 163 Central Locating Service (CLS) asserted the existence of mini-
mal-diversity jurisdiction "because there were more than 100 putative class
members, at least one named plaintiff was diverse from CLS, and the ag-
gregated amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000.'164 In analyzing the
at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2005); Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir.
2005)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1089 (citing Contract Freighters, Inc. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Transp., 260 F.3d 858, 861
(8th Cir. 2001) (Congress is presumed to know the legal background in which it is legislating)).
159. Id. (citing Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1032 (8th Cir. 2003)).
160. Id. (citing Judy v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:05CV1208RWS, 2005 WL 2240088, at *1-2 (E.D. Mo.
Sept. 14, 2005)).
161. Id. at 1090.
162. Rogers v. Cent. Locating Serv. Ltd., No. C05-1911C (W.D. Wash. Feb. 1, 2006).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 3.
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motion to remand, Judge Coughenour examined whether the Complete Di-
versity Standard applied to interstate class actions removed under
CAFA.
1 65
The court began its analysis by pointing out that prior to CAFA, the
"well established rule in all cases was that district courts were to approach
remand motions with a "'strong presumption' against removal jurisdiction
and assign to the removing defendant 'the burden of proving the existence
of jurisdictional facts.' ,166 The court cited Brill for the proposition that
"[p]rinciples of fairness and judicial efficiency also support this presump-
tion, particularly when jurisdiction rests on the defendant's own calcula-
tions of potential exposure under the plaintiffs' claims. '167  The
jurisdictional dispute in Rogers centered around the cost of CLS's compli-
ance with an injunction.
68
CLS argued that CAFA reversed the presumption against removal by
shifting the burden to the opponents of federal court jurisdiction.169 CLS
argued that the shift is evident from the statute. However, the court stated
that "CLS has not identified, nor can the Court locate, anything in the text
of § 1332(d) creating a new presumption in favor of removal jurisdiction or
relieving the defendant of its burden of persuasion., 170  The court thus
framed the question: "Should the Court interpret Congress's silence as en-
acting an implicit change to the well-established presumption against re-
moval jurisdiction? In the usual course, attempting 'to divine congressional
intent from congressional silence' is 'an enterprise of limited utility that
offers a fragile foundation for statutory interpretation.' 1,71
Judge Coughenour stated, "because § 1332 has always been silent on
the applicable presumptions and burdens, both before and after CAFA, the
presumption against removal jurisdiction must be considered a judicial
gloss on the original (silent) statutory language. ' 172  He noted that the
court in Berry held that due to the silence in the original statute, Congress
did not have to explicitly address the burden of proof to effect a change.173
This assumption, the judge wrote, ignores the "uniform body of precedent
165. Id. at 5.
166. Id. (quoting Berry v. Am. Express Publ'g Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
(quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 556 (9th Cir. 1992))).
167. Id. (quoting Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 447-48 (7th Cir. 2005)
("When the defendant has vital knowledge that the plaintiff may lack, a burden that induces the remov-
ing party to come forward with the information-so that the choice between state and federal court
may be made accurately-is much to be desired.")).
168. Id. at 6.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 6-7 (citing Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 717 (9th Cir. 2004)).
172. Id. at 7 (citing 14B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3721 at 324 (3d ed. 2005) (citing "ample support" "at all levels of the federal courts-the Supreme
Court, the courts of appeals, and the district courts-for the proposition that removal statutes will be
strictly construed.")).
173. Id. (citing Berry v. Am. Express Publ'g Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1122-23 (C.D. Cal.
2005).
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applying a clear presumption against removal ....,,4 The court concluded
that "[w]hen a consistent statutory interpretation has been so long settled,
the courts are justifiedly reluctant to read a repeal of that interpretation
into a statutory amendment that is completely silent on the subject.1
75
The court then examined the interpretive value of CAFA's legislative
history. CLS argued that "the text of § 1332(d) is so ambiguous that the
Court must turn to CAFA's legislative history for guidance" and cited Waitt
v. Merck & Co.176 for the proposition that "it is not difficult to divine Con-
gressional intent from CAFA's legislative history.' 77 The court noted
CLS's citation of Waitt and other district court rulings that reversed the
presumption against removal and the burden of establishing jurisdiction,
but found no ambiguity "requiring resort to CAFA's legislative history.
1 78
The court concluded that there was "no basis to conclude that CAFA im-
posed new presumptions and burdens by silent implications or through
bare legislative history.'
' 79
Once again, this court in its analysis apparently overlooked the gui-
dance of Congress as to its intent expressly stated in the "Findings and
Purposes" in Section 2 of CAFA.
8. Werner v. KPMG, LLP"8 °
On February 7, 2006, United States District Judge Lee H. Rosenthal,
writing for the Southern District of Texas, examined the burden-of-proof
issue as an initial consideration in her review of the "commencement" of a
Texas state court action for purposes of determining CAFA jurisdiction.1 '
The court held that CAFA did not apply "because this action 'commenced'
as to the removing defendants before CAFA's enactment and the plaintiffs'
amended pleading filed after CAFA did not 'commence' a new action.'
82
As to the burden-of-proof issue, Judge Rosenthal summarized recent
decisions, beginning by noting the Complete Diversity Standard: "The es-
tablished rule is that because the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdic-
tion has the burden of proof, the removing party has the burden of showing
the propriety of removal."' 83 Additionally, the court wrote that "[tlhe text
of CAFA says nothing about the burden of proof on removal. Several
174. Id.
175. Id. at 8 (cf. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Draper, 66 F.2d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 1933) (noting
that "repeals by implication are not favored"); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988) (reenact-
ment of statute that had been given "consistent judicial interpretation" is deemed to incorporate "the
settled judicial interpretation.")).
176. Waitt v. Merck & Co., No. C05-0759L, 2005 WL 1799740 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2005) (dis-
cussed supra text accompanying notes 52-58).
177. Rogers, No. C05-1911C, at 8 (quoting Waitt, 2005 WL 1799740, at *1).
178. Id. at 8-9 (citing Berry, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1122-23; Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 161,
168 (D. Mass. 2005)).
179. Id. at 10.
180. Werner v. KPMG, LLP, 415 F. Supp. 2d 688 (S.D. Tex, 2006).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 710.
183. Id. at 694 (citing Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 178 n.25 (5th Cir. 2000); Frank v.
Bear Steams & Co., 128 F.3d 919, 921-22 (5th Cir. 1997)); see also Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th
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courts have held that CAFA nonetheless shifted the burden to the plaintiff
to demonstrate that federal jurisdiction does not exist. ' 184 The court then
observed that the courts that have placed the burden of proof on the party
opposing federal jurisdiction have relied on portions of the CAFA's legisla-
tive history-specifically, the Senate Committee Report and the separate
statements of Representative Sensenbrenner and Representative Good-
latte.185 The court did not reference Section 2 of CAFA, however.
Judge Rosenthal pointed out that
[a] number of courts have held that Congress's silence
means that CAFA did not change the burden of proving
federal jurisdiction when a motion to remand is filed. The
Seventh Circuit forcefully summarized the reason for re-
jecting reliance on legislative history to change the burden
of proof when the statute does not address the issue: The
rule that the proponent of federal jurisdiction bears the risk
of non-persuasion has been around for a long time. To
change such a rule, Congress must enact a statute with the
President's signature (or by a two-thirds majority to over-
ride a veto). A declaration by 13 Senators will not serve.186
The court concluded that "[t]he textual silence on the burden of proof,
which contrasts with Congress's express provisions changing a number of
aspects of removal practice for cases that fall under CAFA, leads this court
to join those holding that the party opposing remand continues to bear the
burden of proving federal jurisdiction." 187
9. Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chemical Co.188
On March 7, 2006, the Ninth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, dis-
cussed the burden-of-proof issue: "CAFA did not shift to the plaintiff the
burden of establishing that there is no removal jurisdiction in federal court
and that Dow did not meet its burden."18 9 The case was originally filed by
Cir. 1996) ("[T]here is a presumption against subject matter jurisdiction that must be rebutted by the
party bringing an action to federal court.").
184. Id. (citing Harvey v. Blockbuster, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 749, 752 (D.N.J. 2005); Judy v. Pfizer,
Inc., No. 4:05-CV-1208-RWS, 2005 WL 2240088, at *1-2 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 14, 2005); In re Textainer
P'ship Sec. Litig, No. C 05-0969 MMC, 2005 WL 1799740, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 27, 2005); Waitt v. Merck
& Co., No. C05-0759L, 2005 WL 1799740, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2005); Yeroushalmi v. Blockbus-
ter, Inc., No. CV 05-225-AHM(RCX), 2005 WL 2083008, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2005); Berry v. Am.
Express Publ'g Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1122-23 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 379 F.
Supp. 2d 161 (D. Mass. 2005), aff d on other grounds, 424 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2005)).
185. Id. at 695 (citing Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-
14, at 42-44 (2005); 151 Cong. Rec. H727-730 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner); id. at H732 (state-
ment of Rep. Goodlatte)).
186. Id. (quoting Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2005) (cita-
tions omitted)).
187. Id.
188. Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2006).
189. Id. at 678.
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Panamanian banana workers in California state court, claiming injuries
from exposure to a chemical pesticide banned in the U.S. in 1979 but still in
use in Panama.1 9° Three weeks later, on May 13, 2005, Dow Chemical re-
moved the case to federal court under the mass-action provisions of
CAFA.191 The district court ordered Dow Chemical to show cause as to
whether the amount-in-controversy requirement was met, to which Dow
responded by arguing that CAFA shifted the jurisdictional burden of proof
to the plaintiffs seeking remand. 192 The district court disagreed and re-
manded the case, holding that Dow had failed to meet its burden to prove
that the action was a mass action under CAFA.193 So Dow appealed the
order to the Ninth Circuit.
The court began its opinion by discussing the complete-diversity re-
quirements of Section 1332(a) and the minimal-diversity requirements of
Section 1332(d).194 It then undertook an analysis of Dow's arguments, and
disagreed with Dow's contention that "CAFA shifted the burdens normally
applicable in the removal context," explaining its reasoning:
195
In cases removed from state court, the removing defendant
has "always" borne the burden of establishing federal juris-
diction, including any applicable amount in controversy re-
quirement .... Dow maintains, as it did before the district
court, that CAFA reverses long-standing law by requiring
the plaintiffs, as the parties seeking remand, to refute the
existence of jurisdiction.1
96
The Ninth Circuit cited Brill, noting that the Seventh Circuit had previ-
ously rejected the position Dow set forth because "there simply is no such




Dow's reliance on CAFA's Senate Committee Report did not per-
suade the Ninth Circuit, "[because i]n this instance, the statute is not am-
biguous. Instead, it is entirely silent as to the burden of proof on removal.
Faced with statutory silence on the burden issue, we presume that Congress
is aware of the legal context in which it is legislating. ' 198
190. Id.
191. Id. Regarding CAFA's mass-action provisions and jurisdictional requirements, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(11)(B)(i).
192. Abrego, 443 F.3d at 678.
193. Id. at 679.
194. Id. at 679-82.
195. Id. at 682.
196. Id. at 682-83 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th
Cir. 1992)).
197. Id. at 683 (citing Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2005)
(noting that none of CAFA's language "is even arguably relevant" to this burden-shifting argument)).
198. Id. at 683-84 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-97 (1979) ("It is always
appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law .... ); United
States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Congress is, of course, presumed to know existing
law pertinent to any new legislation it enacts.")).
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As we have noted, CAFA contains a series of modifications
of existing principles of federal subject matter jurisdiction,
both statutory and judge-created. CAFA thus evidences de-
tailed appreciation of the background legal context. Given
the care taken in CAFA to reverse certain established prin-
ciples but not others, the usual presumption that Congress
legislates against an understanding of pertinent legal princi-
ples has particular force. 199
While the Abrego court examined the history and the purposes behind
Congress's objective in limiting access to the federal courts under the Com-
plete Diversity Standard, it failed to discuss in its burden-of-proof analysis
the congressional objective expressly stated in Section 2 of CAFA to ex-
pand access to the federal courts for the narrow category of interstate class
actions.
The Abrego court further stated:
The traditional rule of burden allocation in determining re-
moval jurisdiction was meant to comport with what the Su-
preme Court has termed "[t]he dominant note in the
successive enactments of Congress relating to diversity juris-
diction," that is, "jealous restriction, of avoiding offense to
state sensitiveness, and of relieving the federal courts of the
overwhelming burden of 'business that intrinsically belongs
to the state courts' in order to keep them free for their dis-
tinctive federal business." This rule of restriction extends to
removal jurisdiction, especially insofar as it is based on the
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.2 ° °
The court concluded by holding that "CAFA's silence, coupled with a
sentence in a legislative committee report untethered to any statutory lan-
guage, does not alter the longstanding rule that the party seeking federal
jurisdiction on removal bears the burden of establishing that
jurisdiction. "201
199. Id. at 684 (emphasis in original).
200. Id. at 685 (internal citations omitted). The court found support for its view in Shamrock Oil
& Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941) ("[n]ot only does the language of the Act of 1887
evidence the Congressional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal, but the
policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for
the strict construction of such legislation"); Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32
("The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and 'a suit commenced in a state court must
remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.' These statutory proce-
dures for removal are to be strictly construed." (internal citation omitted)); Gaus, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th
Cir. 1992) ("The 'strong presumption' against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has
the burden of establishing that removal is proper."); and Gould v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New
York, 790 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Removal jurisdiction is statutory and strictly construed.").
201. Id. at 686.
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Like the Brill court, the Abrego court erred in its burden-of-proof
analysis by similarly overlooking Congress's "Findings and Purposes" re-
garding CAFA and its intent to pull interstate class actions into federal
court to correct class-action abuses in the state court systems. Like Brill,
Abrego misapplied canons of statutory construction in reaching a result
that is the opposite of what Congress in the legislative history said it
wanted to achieve. In deciding to disregard CAFA's legislative history, the
Abrego court ignored the contrary approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309, AFL-CIO v. Laidlaw Transit Ser-
vices, Inc.2 °2 In Amalgamated, the Ninth Circuit specifically looked to
CAFA's legislative history to divine congressional intent when interpreting
CAFA's new appeal provision.2 °3
10. Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc.
20 4
On April 8, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a class action in the Circuit Court
of Calhoun County, Alabama, alleging personal injuries and damage to
their Anniston, Alabama, property caused by waste produced over a pe-
riod of eighty-five years by the defendants' manufacturing facilities.2 °5
Walter Industries removed the litigation to federal court under the "mini-
mal diversity" jurisdictional provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act.206
The plaintiffs did not dispute that minimal diversity existed at the threshold
under 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2), but instead sought remand under CAFA's
"local-controversy" exception. 20 7 The plaintiffs, citing §1332(d)(4)(A), ar-
gued that the court must decline to exercise its undisputed minimal-diver-
sity jurisdiction under the exception since more than two-thirds of the class
were Alabama citizens, and U.S. Pipe was a "significant" defendant under
CAFA. 2°8 The district court agreed, applying the local-controversy excep-
tion, and remanded the case to the Alabama state court. Subsequently,
Walter Industries perfected its appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals.20 9
Judge R. Lanier Anderson, writing for the three-judge panel of the
Eleventh Circuit, began his opinion by examining the expedited appeal
process provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1453 as amended by CAFA. This provi-
sion provides for a sixty-day period of review of remand decisions under
CAFA. Noting that § 1453(c)(1) contains the word "may," the circuit
judge held that review by the court of appeals of remand decisions under
CAFA is "clearly discretionary.2 1 0  Following the reasoning of Patterson
202. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309, AFL-CIO v. Laidlaw Trans. Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d
1140 (9th Cir. 2006).
203. 28 U.S.C. 453(c)(1).
204. Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc., 449 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2006).





210. Id. at 1162.
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v. Dean Morris, LLP, 211 Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309, AFL-
CIO v. Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc.,21 2 and Pritchett v. Office Depot,
Inc.,2 13 the Eleventh Circuit held that the sixty-day period begins to run
from the date the court of appeals grants the application to appeal and
allows the appeal to be filed, as opposed to when the appellant applies for
the appeal.214
Judge Anderson next examined the language of the local-controversy
exception,215 recognizing that CAFA's language favors federal jurisdiction
for class actions and that CAFA's legislative history suggests that Congress
intended the local-controversy exception to be narrow.216 Referencing the
statute's legislative history, the court quoted from CAFA's Senate Report
for the tenet that all doubts be resolved "in favor of exercising jurisdiction
over the case."'217 It is important to note that Judge Anderson also quoted
Section 2 of CAFA for the proposition that Congress expanded federal
court jurisdiction "providing for Federal court consideration of interstate
cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction" with only narrow
exceptions, and stated specifically, "these notions are fully confirmed in the
legislative history. "218 The Evans court was the first court at any level to
reference Section 2 of CAFA in connection with a burden-of-proof
analysis.
Judge Anderson then cited Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
2 19
for the proposition that CAFA does not alter the traditional rule that a
party seeking to remove a case to federal court bears the burden of estab-
lishing federal jurisdiction. He did not mention CAFA's legislative history
and the changes discussed therein.22 ° The court also cited Abrego Abrego
v. Dow Chemical Co.,2 2  which followed Brill, for the same proposition,
and without any further analysis, relied on those rulings in concluding
CAFA does not change the well-established rule that the removing party
bears the burden of proof.222 Judge Anderson did, however, hold that the
plaintiffs bore the burden of proving the local-controversy exception by
pointing to two non-CAFA cases, Castleberry v. Goldome Credit Corp.223
and Lazuka v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,224 both of which discuss
211. Patterson v. Dean Morris, LLP, 444 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2006).
212. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309, AFL-CIO v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d
1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2006).
213. Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1093 (10th Cir. 2005).
214. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1162.
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A).
216. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1163.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1164.
219. Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 140-49).
220. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1164.
221. Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 188-203).
222. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1164.
223. Castleberry v. Goldome Credit Corp., 408 F.3d 773 (11th Cir. 2005).
224. Lazuka v. FDIC, 931 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1991).
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the removal of actions involving the FDIC, eschewing any mention of the
portion of CAFA's legislative history mentioned earlier in the opinion.225
Judge Anderson then proceeded to apply the local-controversy excep-
tion to the facts of the case. First, on the issue of whether more than two-
thirds of the class members were Alabama citizens, the court held that the
evidence brought forward by the plaintiffs (an affidavit by the plaintiffs'
attorneys outlining their determination of percentages of Alabama citi-
zens) failed to present a credible estimate of the percentage of class mem-
bers who were citizens of Alabama.226 Second, the court addressed
whether U.S. Pipe was a defendant from whom "significant relief" was
sought and whose conduct formed a "significant basis" for the claims as-
serted by the plaintiffs. Judge Anderson cited Robinson v. Cheetah Trans-
portation2 2 7 and Kearns v. Ford Motor Co.,228 which held that a class seeks
"significant relief" against a defendant when the relief sought against that
defendant is a significant portion of the entire relief sought by the class.22 9
Applying this test, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court
that U.S. Pipe was a "significant defendant. '' 23 ° Following Robinson, Judge
Anderson stated, "whether a putative class seeks significant relief from an
in-state defendant includes not only an assessment of how many members
of the class were harmed by the defendant's actions, but also a comparison
of the relief sought between all defendants and each defendant's ability to
pay a potential judgment. ' 231 He continued, pointing out that neither the
plaintiffs' complaint nor their affidavit addressed the relief sought from
U.S. Pipe or any of the other seventeen named defendants as to liability.232
Moreover, the plaintiffs failed to prove that the conduct of U.S. Pipe
formed a significant basis for their claims.233 The court accordingly held
that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof as to the local-con-
troversy exception.234
11. Miedema v. Maytag Corp.235
In October 2005 Leslie Miedema filed a class action against Maytag in
Florida state court alleging that some of Maytag's ovens had a defective
door latch that allowed heat to escape and damage the components of the
oven.2 36 Maytag removed the action to federal court pursuant to CAFA.
Maytag asserted that the models identified in Miedema's description of the
225. Evans, 449 F.3d 1164-65.
226. Id. at 1166.
227. Robinson v. Cheetah Transp., No. Civ.A. 06-0005, 2006 WL 468820 (W.D. La. Feb. 27, 2006).
228. Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 05-5644 GAF(JTLX), 2005 WL 3967998 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
21, 2005).





234. Id. at 1168.
235. Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2006).
236. Id. at 1324.
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putative class contained a total of 6729 ovens alleged to have been sold in
Florida, which totaled $5,931,971.37
Miedema moved to remand for lack of jurisdiction. She argued that
Maytag had the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction at the
threshold and had failed to carry that burden as to the amount in contro-
versy.238 The district court noted the disagreement among the courts as to
which party bears the burden of proof for minimal diversity under CAFA
and requested additional briefing.239 After discovery, the court remanded
the case to Florida state court, holding that the removing defendant bears
the burden of establishing the existence of minimal diversity and Maytag
did not meet that burden.24 °
Maytag appealed the ruling to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
before Circuit Judges Carnes, Wilson, and Pryor. Judge Wilson rendered
the opinion. It began with a discussion of the seven-day appeal application
rule. Citing the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Pritchett v. Office Depot,
2 4 1
the court held that CAFA's literal "not less than 7 days" rule was a typo-
graphical error in the statute and that Maytag had filed its permission to
appeal within seven days.242
Next, the opinion quickly turned to the sixty-day review limit, holding
that the sixty-day period begins to run from the date when the court of
appeals grants the appellant's application to appeal and files the appeal.
243
The bulk of the opinion then focused on the threshold burden-of-proof
issue under CAFA. Maytag argued that the district court incorrectly ap-
plied the traditional rule in non-CAFA cases that the removing defendant
bears the burden of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction.2 4
Maytag stated that the text of CAFA is silent as to the burden of proof, but
pointed to the legislative history and the clear intent to change the burden
of proof under CAFA.24 5 Maytag specifically noted the Senate Report and
its language placing the burden on the named plaintiff to show that the
removal was improvident.246
The Eleventh Circuit, however, followed the Seventh Circuit opinion
in Brill and the Ninth Circuit opinion in Abrego for the proposition that
"CAFA's silence, coupled with a sentence in the legislative committee re-
port untethered to any statutory language, does not alter the longstanding
rule .... ,,247




241. Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005).
242. Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1326.
243. Id. at 1326-27.
244. Id. at 1327.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1327-28.
247. Id. at 1328.
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Also, the court cited authority for the proposition that "courts have no
authority to enforce principles gleaned solely from legislative history that
has no statutory reference point. ' 248 In footnote five the Eleventh Circuit
disregarded Maytag's citation of Corning Glass Works v. Brennan.249 The
Eleventh Circuit stated that Corning Glass Works "does not actually stand
for the proposition Maytag urges-that legislative history, coupled with
statutory silence, is sufficient to override an already existing, well-estab-
lished rule allocating the burden of proof to a removing defendant." 5 '
The court held in line with the Seventh and Ninth Circuits that the rule
of construing removal statutes strictly and resolving doubts in favor of re-
mand is well-established and the statements in CAFA's legislative history
"are an insufficient basis for departing from this well-established rule.",251
Maytag, in support of its position, pointed the court to Section 2 of
CAFA and its express findings and purposes.52 The court seemed to con-
tradict itself that there is no language connected to the legislative history
when it stated: "While the text of CAFA plainly expands federal jurisdic-
tion over class actions and facilitates their removal, 'we presume that Con-
gress legislates against the backdrop of established principles of state and
federal common law, and that when it wishes to deviate from deeply rooted
principles, it will say so." 253 The Eleventh Circuit concluded, "thus, May-
tag's generalized appeals to CAFA's 'overriding purpose' are unavailing in
the face of CAFA's silence on the traditional, well-established rules that
govern the placement of the burden of proof and the resolution of doubts
in favor of remand.
254
Finally, the court examined the standard of proof as to the amount-in-
controversy element for establishing minimal diversity. Again, following
traditional rules, the court found the amount needed to be proven must be
shown under a preponderance of the evidence standard.255 The Eleventh
Circuit agreed with the district court that Maytag had not established that
the amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000 and affirmed the remand to
Florida state court.256
V. THE AUTHORS' CONCLUSION: CORRECTLY INTERPRETED, CAFA's
TEXT, PURPOSE, AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY CREATE A PRESUMPTION
IN FAVOR OF FINDING THAT MINIMAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION EXISTS,
WITH THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE PARTY OPPOSING JURISDICTION
Most jurisdictional contests involve close facts or legal issues. Due to
the enormous stakes involved in class-action litigation, whether the case
248. Id.
249. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) (discussed infra Section V.A.).
250. Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1328 n.5.
251. Id. at 1329.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1329-30.
255. Id. at 1330.
256. Id. at 1332.
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proceeds in state court or in federal court has significant implications, both
in terms of strategy and in exposure analysis, for the parties.
Under well-settled jurisprudence applying the Complete Diversity
Standard, the party seeking federal jurisdiction clearly bears the burden of
establishing that all requirements have been met, with all doubts resolved
in favor of the party opposing federal jurisdiction. This result flows from
the federalism and other concerns behind congressional intent to limit ac-
cess to federal courts under the complete-diversity statute.
Few will dispute that Congress, by adopting CAFA, sought to increase
access to the federal courts for interstate class actions; the conflict in the
cases involves the narrower question focused on who bears the jurisdic-
tional burden of proof. Proponents of the expansive Minimal Diversity
Standard assert that a fair reading of the operative provisions in CAFA's
text reflects that Congress intended to shift the burden of proof to persons
opposing federal jurisdiction over interstate class actions by dramatically
easing restrictions under the Complete Diversity Standard." 7 Further sup-
porting this conclusion is CAFA Section 2, "Findings and Purposes," which
expressly explains the strong congressional policy seeking to limit class-ac-
tion abuses in the state courts by allowing more interstate class actions to
be maintained in the federal courts.
Moreover, no one disputes that Congress in the legislative history ex-
plicitly stated that the burden of proof is on the party opposing federal
court jurisdiction under CAFA, and that all doubts are to be resolved in
favor of determining federal jurisdiction. However, as noted above, some
courts have declined to consider that legislative history as authoritative,
and in turn have reached a result that is the opposite of what Congress
stated it intended in that history. Thus, the outcome-determinative ques-
tion in cases looking at who bears the jurisdictional burden of proof under
CAFA involves less a dispute over what words are in the legislative history,
but rather, whether the court may properly reach those words of Congress
under doctrines of statutory interpretation, and then apply those words.
All the courts thus far rejecting the use of CAFA's legislative history
or application of the Minimal Diversity Standard have instead applied the
257. In Wallace v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp., 444 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2006), the
Fifth Circuit reversed a remand order after examining the legislative history of the Multiparty, Mul-
tiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act (MMTJA), another recently enacted statute granting "minimal diversity"
jurisdiction to expand federal jurisdiction for a special category of disputes. The MMTJA's minimal-
diversity provisions are very similar to those in CAFA in many respects. Decisions on these analogous
MMTJA provisions may provide persuasive authority under CAFA. The court noted that the House
Sponsor's Report "makes clear [that] the MMTJA was designed to ameliorate the restrictions on the
exercise of federal jurisdiction that ultimately forced parties in multiple suits arising from the same
disaster to litigate in several fora. To hamstring the removal statute by misapplying the abstention
provisions would undercut the MMTJA's ultimate goal of consolidation." Id. at 702. Wallace shows
another instance where Congress carved out a narrow category of cases-mass tort suits filed in multi-
ple courts-with the objective of granting them a new path to federal court where the existing restric-
tive Complete Diversity Standard had previously blocked that path. The MMTJA also appears to
create a presumption in favor of a finding of jurisdiction, with the burden of proof on the party oppos-
ing jurisdiction.
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Complete Diversity Standard to interstate class actions to find a presump-
tion against jurisdiction. Each of these courts appears to have applied in-
correct doctrinal principles of statutory construction. Moreover, there are
few if any references in these courts' analyses of the burden-of-proof issue
to Congress's "Findings and Purposes" under CAFA Section 2. These
analyses of the clear words in the text of CAFA have apparently been over-
looked by those courts. Accordingly, it is the view of the authors that those
cases are incorrectly decided.
A. Proper Statutory Construction Principles Require Consideration of
CAFA's Legislative History in Deciding the Burden-of-Proof Question
Neither Brill, Abrego, nor any other decisions applying the Complete
Diversity Standard to CAFA's burden-of-proof question have followed the
United States Supreme Court's well-established test to determine which
party bears the burden of proof in adjudicating statutorily dictated stan-
dards. The Supreme Court has crafted a three-pronged inquiry to construe
a statutorily created standard when it is necessary to interpret the statute to
determine which party bears the burden of proving that the standard has
been met:
1. The court should first determine whether the statutory
text states which party bears the burden of proof.
2. If the statutory language is silent, the court should next
determine if the legislative history indicates which party
bears the burden of proof.
3. If both the statutory language and legislative history are
silent, only then should the court apply other recognized
rules of statutory construction to allocate the burden of
proof.
For example, the Supreme Court applied this test in Coming Glass
Works v. Brennan2 58 to determine the burden of proof under a provision of
the Equal Pay Act that prohibited an employer from paying unequal wages
for equal work on the basis of gender. That provision, however, failed to
address the burden of proof. The Secretary of Labor sued Corning under
the statute. The Court held that "[a]lthough the Act is silent on this point,
its legislative history makes plain that the Secretary has the burden of proof
on this issue. '25 9 Corning Glass Works, therefore, sets forth the proposi-
tion that when deciding which party bears the burden of proof under a
statutory standard, a court must first look at the statute's text for the an-
swer, and if the text is silent, the court should then look to the legislative
history to see if it resolves that issue. If the legislative history contains the
258. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
259. Id. at 195.
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answer to the burden-of-proof question, then no further analysis or use of
other canons of construction is necessary.
The Supreme Court followed the same three-step process in Grogan v.
Garner2 6° to address the burden of proof under an exception to discharge
found at § 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court explained that "we
begin our inquiry into the appropriate burden of proof under § 523 by ex-
amining the language of the statute and its legislative history."'2 61 It first
noted that "[t]he language of § 523 does not prescribe the standard of
proof for the discharge exceptions. 2 62 The Court then found that "[t]he
legislative history of § 523 ... is also silent., 26 3 Only after having ex-
hausted the first two steps of the test did the Court hold that Congress
should be presumed to have intended the preponderance standard other-
wise generally applicable in civil actions.264
While the Brill court did not apply this test, the test had been followed
by the Seventh Circuit earlier in Dadian v. Village of Wilmette.265  In
Dadian, the burden of proof was at issue under a section of the Fair Hous-
ing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA) that established a safety standard
for denying housing, but which was silent about which party bore the bur-
den of proof regarding that standard. The provision at issue simply said
that "nothing in this subsection requires that a dwelling be made available
to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals. ' 26 6 The Seventh Circuit held that "the
text and legislative history of the FHAA support imposing the burden of
proof on the public entity that asserts safety as a defense to a disability
discrimination action. '267 Moreover, contrary to the Brill panel's opposi-
tion to considering CAFA's legislative history, the Seventh Circuit in
Dadian quoted statements from a House Report in holding that "[t]he leg-
islative history shows that this section was intended to incorporate the stan-
dard articulated" in a specific prior case, and that "[b]ased on these
statements, we conclude that a public entity that asserts the reason it failed
to accommodate a disabled individual was because she posed a direct
threat to safety bears the burden of proof on that defense at trial.
268 If
Brill and its progeny had followed the Supreme Court's three-part Coming
260. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991).
261. Id. at 286.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. See also Raleigh v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 21-22 & 22 n.2 (2000) (applying
the burden-of-proof rule developed in analogous cases only after examining both the provisions in the
text and the legislative history and finding that "there is no sign that Congress meant to alter the
burdens of production and persuasion"); Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Calif., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers
Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1993) (in burden-of-proof case where statutory language was am-
biguous, looking first for "the legislative purpose as revealed by the history of the statute" and, only
after that was unfruitful, taking the third step of applying "a different rule of construction").
265. Dadian v. Village of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2001).
266. Id. at 840 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9)).
267. Id.
268, Id. at 840-41.
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Glass Works test, as did the Dadian court, the outcome in Brill and its
progeny would have been different.
The Corning Glass Works three-pronged test makes clear that allocat-
ing the burden of proof under a federal statute is simply part and parcel of,
and consistent with, the usual methods for interpreting that statute. Those
methods involve looking first at the plain language of the statute as a
whole, then at its legislative history, and, only if those indicia do not settle
the question, then to general canons of construction.2 69 The general canons
of construction are "designed to help judges determine the Legislature's
intent as embodied in particular statutory language.
27 °
Specifically, the canon of construction under which a court examines
existing legal principles at the time of enactment-for example, the collec-
tive jurisprudence and statutory provisions underpinning the Complete Di-
versity Standard when CAFA was enacted-is only one way to ascertain
congressional intent, because, without better evidence, Congress is pre-
sumed to know existing law and intend that same meaning.27' Signifi-
cantly, however, those other techniques and canons "to help judges
determine the Legislature's intent" are irrelevant and should not be consid-
ered where Congress has expressly stated its intended meaning of the statu-
tory text, either in the words of the law itself or in its legislative history,
such as it has with CAFA.272 Thus, in deciding whether a federal statute
such as CAFA is expansive enough to preempt existing judge-made law
such as the Complete Diversity Standard, courts are required to examine
the statute's text; its purpose and scope; and its legislative history.273
These same principles of statutory construction apply equally when the
statute in question is jurisdictional in nature, like CAFA, because the scope
of federal jurisdiction is for Congress to determine, subject only to the lim-
its of Article 111.274 Thus, "[w]hatever [a court] say[s] regarding the scope
of jurisdiction conferred by a particular statute can of course be changed by
Congress." '275 Further, "[n]o sound canon of interpretation requires Con-
gress to speak with extraordinary clarity in order to modify the rules of
269. See, e.g., Scheidler v. NOW, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1264 (2006).
270. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001).
271. See, e.g., Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 500-01 (2000).
272. See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 94 (adopting interpretation supported by legislative
history and explaining that "other circumstances evidencing congressional intent can overcome [the
canons'] force"); Am. Soc'y of Cataract & Refractive Surgery v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir.
2002) ("we also recognize that 'all presumptions used in interpreting statutes may be overcome by, inter
alia, specific language or specific legislative history that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent"')
(citation omitted). Cf Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336, 341 (2000) (because "where Congress has
made its intent clear, 'we must give effect to that intent,"' court cannot resort to canon of construction
producing interpretation contrary to that expressed intent) (citation omitted).
273. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 316-26 (1981); Astoria Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991).
274. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1992) (Every inferior court "derives its juris-
diction wholly from the authority of Congress. That body may give, withhold or restrict such jurisdic-
tion, at its discretion, provided it not be extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution.")
275. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (overruled by 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990)).
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federal jurisdiction within appropriate constitutional bounds. '276 Courts
have recognized under other jurisdictional statutes, in light of these princi-
ples, that Congress is free to place the burden of proof on the party oppos-
ing federal jurisdiction if it chooses to do so. For example, the Supreme
Court recently held that, since the amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 in 1948,
"there has been no question that whenever the subject matter of an action
qualifies it for removal, the burden is on a plaintiff to find an express
exception.,
277
Accordingly, Brill, Abrego, and similar decisions declining to consider
as authoritative CAFA's legislative history explicitly answering the burden-
of-proof question are incorrectly decided. Those same courts also failed to
take into account in their analyses the "Findings and Purposes" in CAFA
Section 2, which are supported by this legislative history. Those courts
erred by, among other things, applying the wrong methodology for statu-
tory construction of CAFA. It is also important to note that Miedema v.
Maytag Corp. quickly dismissed this exact method of statutory interpreta-
tion in a footnote, without any analysis.278
B. CAFA's Plain Text Reflects Congress's Intent to Expand Substantially
Federal Jurisdiction Over Interstate Class Actions by Abolishing
Existing Limitations Under the Complete Diversity Standard
While maintaining the requirements of complete diversity for other
types of cases, CAFA changed the jurisdictional standard applicable to in-
terstate class actions. CAFA did this by requiring only minimal diversity,
and by lowering the procedural hurdles that previously helped trap inter-
state class actions in the state courts due to restrictions under the existing
Complete Diversity Standard. The text of the Act contains findings of con-
gressional intent that accentuate the reversal in approach for interstate
class actions from that used under the Complete Diversity Standard and
that suggest minimal-diversity jurisdiction should be presumed.
When interpreting a statute such as CAFA, courts begin by looking at
"the plain language of the statute itself." '279 Once again, the "plain lan-
guage" of Section 2 of CAFA as enacted (and now found in the historical
and statutory notes to new 28 U.S.C. 1711) states in part as follows:
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS. Congress finds the following:
276. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2620 (2005).
277. Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 698 (2003) (emphasis added). See
also Lazuka v. FDIC, 931 F.2d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1991) (overruled in part by 12 U.S.C. 1819(b)(2)(B)
(1994)) (interpreting 12 U.S.C. § 1819 as "creating a rebuttable presumption of federal jurisdiction" in
light of Congress's intent "to afford the FDIC every possibility of having a federal forum within the
limits of Article III"); Reding v. FDIC, 942 F.2d 1254, 1258 (8th Cir. 1991) (same); Sissoko v. Rocha,
440 F.3d 1145, 1160-63 (9th Cir. 2006) (the government bears the burden of proving absence of federal
court jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)).
278. Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1328 n.5 (11th Cir. 2006).
279. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
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(2) Over the past decade, there have been abuses of the
class action device that have
(A) harmed class members with legitimate claims
and defendants that have acted responsibly;
(B) adversely affected interstate commerce; and
(C) undermined public respect for our judicial
system.
(4) Abuses in class actions undermine the national judi-
cial system, the free flow of interstate commerce, and
the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the
framers of the United States Constitution, in that State
and local courts are
(A) keeping cases of national importance out of
Federal court;
(B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate
bias against out-of-State defendants; and
(C) making judgments that impose their view of
the law on other States and bind the rights of the
residents of those States.
(b) PURPOSES. The purposes of this Act are to
(2) restore the intent of the framers of the United
States Constitution by providing for Federal court con-
sideration of interstate cases of national importance
under diversity jurisdiction .... 280
CAFA's "Findings and Purposes" demonstrate Congress's concern
that abuses in interstate class actions undermined the constitutional intent
behind diversity jurisdiction for this type of case. Following its conclusion
that abuses in class actions undermined the national judicial system, the
free flow of interstate commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction
as intended by the framers, Congress stated in Section 2(b) of CAFA that
one purpose of the law is "to restore the intent of the framers of the United
States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of inter-
state cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction." ' Con-
gress noted that without this new expansive federal jurisdiction, class-
action cases of national importance were being kept out of federal court
and resulting in state court bias against out-of-state defendants.
282
Congress's desire to eliminate the restrictions imposed by the Com-
plete Diversity Standard for class-action litigation under CAFA is apparent
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not merely from its "Findings and Purposes," but from a cursory review of
the actual operative provisions of the Act as well. Under those provisions,
Congress expanded the scope of jurisdiction by use of minimal diversity. It
also abolished for interstate class actions most of the existing hurdles to
removal that had limited a defendant's ability to seek a federal forum
under the Complete Diversity Standard. For example, federal jurisdiction
now exists as long as any one named plaintiff or putative class member is a
citizen of a different state than any one defendant, and the $5,000,000 juris-
dictional amount is satisfied. Diversity must no longer be "complete" for
interstate class actions. CAFA also allows aggregation of class member
claims, statutorily overruling jurisprudence that had required either that
each plaintiff in a class action must independently satisfy the $75,000
amount-in-controversy requirement under the Complete Diversity Stan-
dard, or, alternatively, that at least one named plaintiff satisfy this require-
ment.283 In addition to eliminating the need for complete diversity and
allowing aggregation of class member claims, CAFA further expands fed-
eral jurisdiction by its new definition of "class action"28 and by the crea-
tion of the new "mass actions" category 85 Similarly, CAFA exempts
interstate class actions from the one-year limitation on removal that other-
wise applies in complete-diversity cases.286 And unlike the rule under the
Complete Diversity Standard, CAFA provides that a class action may be
removed by any defendant without the consent of the other defendants and
without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the state where the
action is brought.
2 87
CAFA also creates for the first time federal appellate jurisdiction over
remand orders in class actions removed under the statute. Prior to CAFA,
28 U.S.C. 1447(d) barred appellate review of virtually all remand orders in
matters removed under complete-diversity jurisdiction. New 28 U.S.C.
1453(c), however, permits discretionary appeals of orders on motions to
283. In Exxon-Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2627-28
(2005), the Supreme Court acknowledged that CAFA "abrogates the rule against aggregating claims"
first recognized in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921), and "reaffirmed" in Zahn
v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
284. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1), as amended by CAFA, which tracks the language of new 28 U.S.C.
§ 1711, provides,
In this subsection-
(A) the term "class" means all of the class members in a class action;
(B) the term "class action" means any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to
be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action;
(C) the term "class certification order" means an order issued by a court approving the treat-
ment of some or all aspects of a civil action as a class action; and
(D) the term "class members" means the persons (named or unnamed) who fall within the
definition of the proposed or certified class in a class action.
285. "As used in subparagraph (A), the term 'mass action' means any civil action (except a civil
action within the scope of section 1711(2)) in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are
proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law
or fact, except that jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy
the jurisdictional amount requirements under subsection (a)." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(11)(B)(i).
286. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c).
287. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).
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remand class actions removed on minimal-diversity grounds. This provi-
sion also requires the courts of appeals to expedite consideration of CAFA
appeals.
These fundamental changes greatly liberalize and invite, rather than
discourage, federal court jurisdiction over class actions within the scope of
CAFA. These different provisions suggest that Congress intended to carve
out for the narrow category of interstate class actions a presumption in
favor of federal jurisdiction. Unlike the Complete Diversity Standard,
CAFA restores federal jurisdiction to its full constitutional limits of mini-
mal diversity, and rejects the limited-access-to-federal-court approach that
resulted under the Complete Diversity Standard and its concomitant bur-
den of proof on the party asserting federal jurisdiction.
C. CAFA's Legislative History Expressly Assigns the Burden of Proof to
the Party Opposing Minimal Diversity Jurisdiction
Not only does the plain text of CAFA show congressional intent to
change the status quo for interstate class actions, thus necessitating a differ-
ent burden-of-proof rule, but its legislative history expressly says that that
is what Congress intended.
CAFA's legislative history includes the House Sponsors' Statement
and the Senate Judiciary Committee Report. The Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee Report is the "authoritative" evidence of congressional intent, 88
and the House Sponsor's Statement is properly accorded substantial weight
in interpreting the Act.289
Application of the Complete Diversity Standard, placing the burden of
proof on the party proposing federal jurisdiction, is diametrically contrary
to the express provisions of CAFA's legislative history and the will of Con-
gress. So is application of a standard that establishes a presumption against
federal jurisdiction.
As previously noted, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report expressly
states that the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs to show that the require-
ments for removal are not satisfied, and that in calculating the amount in
dispute, the court should err in favor exercising jurisdiction:
The Committee intends this subsection to be interpreted ex-
pansively. If a purported class action is removed pursuant
288. The Senate Judiciary Committee published its report on CAFA on February 28, 2005. S.
Rep. 109-14 (2005). "Committee Reports are 'the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's
intent,' and may be consulted as one important resource in the quest for faithful statutory interpreta-
tion." Berry v. Am. Express Publ'g Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Garcia v.
United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984); accord City of Edmonds v. Wash. State Bldg. Code Council, 18
F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1994)).
289. Representative F. James Sensenbrenner (R. Wis.) placed into the House record a statement
of the intent of the creators of CAFA. 151 Cong. Rec. H723-02, at H727-29 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005).
Because this Sponsor's Statement relates to the intent of the drafters of CAFA, it deserves to be ac-
corded substantial weight in interpreting the statute. See Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,
426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976); Nat'l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 640 (1967); Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951).
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to these jurisdictional provisions, the named plaintiff(s)
should bear the burden of demonstrating that the removal
was improvident (i.e., that the applicable jurisdictional re-
quirements are not satisfied). And if a federal court is un-
certain about whether "all matters in controversy" in a
purported class action "do not in the aggregate exceed the
sum or value of $5,000,000," the court should err in favor of
exercising jurisdiction over the case.290
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report likewise expressly states that
the burden of proof with respect to other jurisdictional issues arising under
CAFA is on the party disputing federal court jurisdiction.2 91 Indeed, the
Report makes clear that CAFA creates a strong bias in favor of finding that
federal jurisdiction exists:
Overall, new section 1332(d) is intended to expand substan-
tially federal court jurisdiction over class actions. Its provi-
sions should be read broadly, with a strong preference that
interstate class actions should be heard in a federal court if
properly removed by any defendant.292
Similarly, the House Sponsors' Statement explicitly states that "new
section 1332(d) is intended to expand substantially Federal court jurisdic-
tion over class actions," that "[i]ts provisions should be read broadly, with a
strong preference that interstate class actions should be heard in a Federal
court if removed by any defendant," and that once a case is removed, "the
named plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demonstrating that the re-
moval was improper. "293
D. Congress Intended a Different Jurisdictional Burden-of-Proof
Standard for Minimal Diversity than It Did for Complete
Diversity, Because the Purposes Behind the Two Enabling
Statutes Are Not Only Different, But Opposite
Some courts have applied the Complete Diversity Standard, which
places the burden of proof on the proponent of jurisdiction, to disputes
over minimal-diversity jurisdiction under CAFA.2 94 That result defeats
CAFA's intended purpose. It is misguided because there is no compelling
reason to attach a burden-of-proof test developed to limit entry into fed-
eral court of actions grounded in complete-diversity jurisdiction, when min-
imal diversity for interstate class actions was created specifically to
overcome those very limitations and pull more of these cases into federal
290. S. Rep. 109-14 (2005), at 42 (emphasis added).
291. Id. at 34, 42-44.
292. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
293. 151 Cong. Rec. at H727.
294. See, e.g., Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005).
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court for the first time. It is incorrect to apply the general canon of statu-
tory construction to this CAFA burden-of-proof question-that Congress
is presumed to enact laws against the backdrop of existing precedent-be-
cause this canon is inoperative where congressional intention and purpose
are evident or is inconsistent with the axiom.295 This outcome is wholly
consistent with the general rule of interpretation that a statute may not be
interpreted through canons of construction in a way that frustrates its pur-
pose or effect.296
A careful review of the context and history of the complete-diversity
statute and the cases leading to the Complete Diversity Standard demon-
strate that it should not be applied in CAFA cases. The rule that the bur-
den of proof as to jurisdiction in a complete-diversity case rests on the
party seeking the federal forum was created primarily because, the courts
concluded, Congress intended that complete-diversity enabling statute be
construed narrowly. This was the precise holding in Thomson v. Gaskill,
297
where the Supreme Court explained:
The policy of the statute conferring diversity jurisdiction
upon the district courts calls for its strict construction. Ac-
cordingly, if a plaintiff's allegations of jurisdictional facts are
challenged by the defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden
of supporting the allegations by competent proof.
2 98
The historical basis for this strict-construction rule for complete-diver-
sity cases confirms that it should not be blindly applied to CAFA cases.
The Constitution permits Congress to allow for federal court jurisdiction
over any suit that involves "Citizens of the Several states" and thus empow-
ers Congress to authorize federal court jurisdiction over cases involving
minimal diversity.299 But the Judiciary Act of 1789 was much more limited,
authorizing diversity jurisdiction only as to disputes where all plaintiffs
were diverse in citizenship from all defendants.3"
When Congress imposed complete diversity as a prerequisite for en-
gaging federal court's jurisdiction, courts struggled with the dichotomy be-
tween the plaintiff's right to choose the forum in which to litigate, and the
295. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
296. E.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005); Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952); Jamison v.
Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 (1940).
297. Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 673, 675 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.).
298. Id. at 675 (citations omitted); see also McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298
U.S. 178, 189 (1936).
299. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
300. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). The diversity statute, now found at 28
U.S.C. § 1332, required complete diversity until the recent enactment of minimal-diversity statutes,
such as CAFA. For a historical view of federal court diversity jurisdiction, see Charles Warren, New
Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 83 (1923).
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defendant's right to remove the case to federal court and to have the
"equal benefit" of federal court jurisdiction.3 10'
Based on the restrictive nature of the jurisdictional grant of complete
diversity, the Supreme Court concluded that the various limitations on
complete-diversity jurisdiction were warranted in order to effectuate Con-
gress's intent to "drastically restrict" access to the federal forum out of
respect for state courts and to avoid creating additional federal court litiga-
tion.30 2 Likewise, the Supreme Court has generally instructed federal
courts to narrowly construe the complete-diversity statute, so as not to frus-
trate that congressional purpose.30 3
However, the conclusion that complete-diversity jurisdiction should be
strictly construed (and the burden of proof allocated based on that conclu-
sion) does not logically carry over to minimal-diversity jurisdiction under
CAFA. In enacting CAFA, Congress went in the opposite direction.
Through CAFA, Congress manifestly intended to wrest from the state
courts control over interstate class actions and to add them to the federal
courts' workload to avoid abuses in the state courts. As one of three stated
purposes, CAFA was intended to "restore the intent of the framers ... by
providing for Federal court consideration of cases of national impor-
tance. ' 30 4 Congress specifically found in Section 2 of CAFA that the tradi-
tional allocation of national judicial resources under the restrictive
Complete Diversity Standard had led to "State and local courts.. . keeping
cases of national importance out of Federal court," "sometimes... demon-
strat[ing] bias against out-of-State defendants" and "impos[ing] their view
of the law on other States and bind[ing] the rights of the residents of those
other States."30 5 Thus, the text of CAFA rejects the primary policy reasons
why complete-diversity jurisdiction has been strictly construed, 0 6 and
removes numerous existing restrictions on complete-diversity jurisdiction
and removal.
With these stated intentions and supporting changes under CAFA, the
traditional allocation of the burden of proof used in the complete-diversity
setting cannot be reconciled with CAFA. Because the congressional inten-
tions underlying the two different jurisdictional enabling statutes pull in
opposite directions, their resulting burden-of-proof rules must likewise
point in opposite directions.
301. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 348 (1816); Ry. Co. v. Whilton's Adm'r, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 289 (1871) (protection against local prejudice is secured by giving plaintiff an elec-
tion of courts before suit is brought, and "where the suit was commenced in a State court[,] a like
election to the defendant afterwards"); Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 86 U.S. 214, 224 (1873) ("The [removal] stat-
ute is remedial, and must be construed liberally.").
302. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934); City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank of City of
N.Y., 314 U.S. 63, 76 (1941); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938);
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941).
303. See, e.g., Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446; Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 76; Snyder v. Harris,
394 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1969); Healy, 292 U.S. at 269-70.
304. Pub. L. 109-2, § 2(b), 119 Stat. at 5.
305. Id. at § 2(a).
306. See, e.g., Healy, 292 U.S. at 270; Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 76.
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E. Brill, Abrego, and Similar Decisions Are Incorrect
The Abrego3 ° 7 and BrilP°8 decisions erroneously imported the Com-
plete Diversity Standard and applied it to interstate class actions where the
Minimal Diversity Standard should have been applied. Those opinions and
their hostility to the use of contrary legislative history force the square peg
of the Complete Diversity Standard burden of proof into the round hole of
minimal-diversity jurisdiction, and do not withstand scrutiny. A primary
mistake in these decisions was that they completely ignored the congres-
sional intent found in CAFA's "Findings and Purposes."
Abrego, which mechanically followed Brill, held that "CAFA's silence,
coupled with a sentence in a legislative committee report untethered to any
statutory language, does not alter the longstanding rule that the party seek-
ing federal jurisdiction on removal bears the burden of establishing that
jurisdiction."3 °9  The foundation for this holding is in the court's
conclusion:
The traditional rule of burden allocation in determining re-
moval jurisdiction was meant to comport with what the Su-
preme Court has termed "[t]he dominant note in the
successive enactments of Congress relating to diversity juris-
diction," that is, "jealous restriction, of avoiding offense to
state sensitiveness, and of relieving the federal courts of the
overwhelming burden of 'business that intrinsically belongs
to the state courts' in order to keep them free for their dis-
tinctive federal business.
310
However, even though the Abrego court looked at the purposes be-
hind the Complete Diversity Standard, it ignored the opposite purposes
stated by Congress for passing CAFA: to expand federal court jurisdiction
for interstate class actions, which the face of the statue itself describes as
cases of national importance.311
Brill opined that the burden-of-proof language from the Senate Com-
mittee Report is "unconnected to any enacted text. ' 312 In fact, however,
CAFA's legislative history is directly connected to the "enacted text" of
CAFA in two respects: first, as described above, the enacted text of CAFA
establishes a new statutory standard for federal court jurisdiction and re-
moval and, just as in Corning Glass Works, the legislative history explicates
307. Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 188-203).
308. Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 140-49).
309. Abrego, 443 F.3d at 686.
310. Id. 685 (citations omitted); see also supra note 202.
311. See 28 U.S.C. § 1711, Pub. L. 109-2, § 2(a)(4)(A).
312. Brill, 427 F.3d at 448.
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that text. Second, CAFA's legislative history stating that Congress in-
tended to impose the burden of proof on the party opposing federal juris-
diction to minimize existing abuses improperly keeping interstate class
actions out of federal court directly relates to and informs the "Findings
and Purposes" set forth in Section 2 of the Act.
Giving short shrift to both the operative text and the legislative his-
tory, and overlooking the Act's "Findings and Purposes," the Brill court
held that the burden-of-proof rule under the Complete Diversity Standard
should be presumed to have been intended under CAFA by Congress, de-
spite the very different minimal-diversity standard actually created by
CAFA (and by the drafters' statements to the contrary). 313 As the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly held, however, the canon of construction ap-
plied in Brill, Abrego, and similar rulings cannot be invoked to negate
congressional intent that may otherwise be discerned from an act's text or
legislative history.314
In addition, the Brill court's belief that its rule "makes practical sense"
is unpersuasive. First, it is up to Congress to decide whether practical sense
is better served by placing the burden on the party seeking or opposing
federal jurisdiction. As both Section 2 of the Act and CAFA's legislative
history make clear, Congress concluded that the practical need to change
the status quo to prevent class-action abuses in state courts and to get these
cases into the more neutral federal courts required allocating the burden to
the party contesting jurisdiction. Moreover, that conclusion logically
makes sense as well, because, as noted by the drafters, unless the burden is
on the plaintiffs, who draft the complaint and supporting documents and
who can easily minimize or even conceal what is genuinely at stake in the
case, the purposes of the Act cannot be fulfilled.
Brill-the first and "leading" decision on this issue-reached an incor-
rect conclusion by, among other things, applying an erroneous standard for
statutory interpretation, and by completely overlooking Section 2 of
CAFA's "Findings and Purposes." Abrego and Evans are unpersuasive be-
cause they simply followed Brill, without any independent analysis. Mie-
dema does acknowledge the existence of CAFA's "Findings and Purposes"
under Section 2, noting the critical point that one CAFA purpose stated in
its text is to "restore" the intent of the framers of the Constitution "by
providing for federal court consideration of interstate cases of national im-
portance under diversity jurisdiction" for class-action cases previously
313. Id.
314. See, e.g., Scheidler v. NOW, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1264, 1273 (2006) (the canons of construction "are
tools designed to help courts better determine what Congress intended, not to lead courts to interpret
the law contrary to that intent."). The Seventh Circuit also mistakenly relied on Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552, 566-68 (1988). That case involved the reenactment of a law that already had been inter-
preted by the courts. Here, CAFA enacted a wholly new statutory provision that, as shown above,
instituted a welcoming approach that was diametrically opposed to the approach under previously en-
acted statutes.
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blocked from the federal courts.315 The word "restore" in CAFA's text
connotes that changes were made in the status quo for removal and juris-
dictional rules standards which includes the burden of proof. That and
other textual language in Section 2 showing Congress's intent to liberalize
federal jurisdiction over class actions, when contrasted with the traditional
removal standard that is strictly interpreted against federal jurisdiction, at
least creates ambiguity sufficient to open the door to consideration of
CAFA's legislative history. Similarly, a fair analysis of all of CAFA's new
removal and jurisdictional provisions, when read together in an integrated
fashion, creates further ambiguity in the text that calls appropriately for the
courts to study the legislative history regarding the burden-of-proof issue.
Miedema, however, using artificial distinctions, rejected consideration
of the congressional intent on point, and, tracking Brill, concluded that if
Congress really intended to change the threshold removal burden-of-proof
standard, it would have specifically said so in the statute. Miedema did not
acknowledge the existence of any ambiguities created by Section 2. It
therefore ignored the contrary pronouncements in the Senate Judiciary
Committee Report and House Sponsors' Statement expressly stating that
under CAFA the threshold burden of proof falls on the party opposing
removal.
Finally, the hostility shown by the Brill and Abrego courts to using
CAFA's legislative history-the avoidance of which is the essential
lynchpin of those rulings-has not been shared by other circuit courts in
interpreting CAFA. In fact, other circuits, including a sister panel to
Abrego, have looked to and relied on the legislative history when CAFA's
explicit text was unambiguous to reach a result that is directly contrary to
the text of CAFA.31 6 In those cases, the courts relied extensively on
CAFA's legislative history to come to each of their conclusions. In Amal-
gamated Transit Union, the Ninth Circuit declared that a portion of the
literal language of CAFA is at odds with congressional intent and held that
parties must pursue appellate review of a remand not more than seven
court days after the district court's order, despite the contrary text of
CAFA.317 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit examined the Senate Report of
CAFA in Pritchett in coming to the same conclusion.318 The Tenth Circuit
described the issue as "one of the rare cases in which a 'literal application
of the statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions
of its drafters."'31 9 Along the same lines, the Fifth Circuit has handed
315. Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1329 n.6 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Section 2 of
CAFA).
316. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309, AFL-CIO v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d
1140 (9th Cir. 2006); Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1095 (10th Cir. 2005) (relying on
CAFA's legislative history to determine Congress's intent on the "date of commencement issue").
317. Amalgamated Transit Union, 435 F.3d 1140.
318. Pritchett, 420 F.3d at 1093 n.2.
319. Id. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)).
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down three separate decisions relying on CAFA's legislative history exten-
sively to interpret its provisions.320 When viewed in light of these decisions
and their free use of CAFA's legislative history, it appears that Brill and its
progeny are applying an incorrect and overly restrictive standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
CAFA was created by Congress in part to remedy abuses involving
interstate class actions that historically have been trapped in the state court
system due to restrictions inherent under complete-diversity jurisdiction.
Congress sought to "restore the intent of the framers of the United States
Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate
cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction." To this end,
Congress substantially expanded federal court jurisdiction over interstate
class actions through the vehicles of minimal diversity, liberalized removal
rules, and new powers allowing appellate review of remand orders. In an-
swer to the question of who bears the burden of proving CAFA's minimal-
diversity jurisdiction, some courts have not carefully considered the pole-
star shift underpinning the congressional purpose in adopting CAFA and
have incorrectly applied the preexisting Complete Diversity Standard,
which placed the jurisdictional burden of proof on the proponent of federal
jurisdiction. Correctly interpreted, however, CAFA's text, purposes, and
legislative history create a presumption in favor of finding that minimal-
diversity jurisdiction exists, with the burden of proof assigned to the party
opposing jurisdiction. The statute that enables complete-diversity jurisdic-
tion and CAFA, which enables minimal-diversity jurisdiction, are not just
different in purpose; congressional intent behind each goes in opposite di-
rections. For complete-diversity jurisdiction, Congress intended to restrict
access to the federal courts, leading the courts to assign the burden of proof
to the party asserting jurisdiction. For minimal-diversity jurisdiction under
CAFA, on the other hand, Congress intended to substantially expand ac-
cess to the federal courts for those interstate class actions that previously
were blocked from federal court due to existing rules for complete diver-
sity. The Act's legislative history expressly states Congress's intent to
change that status quo and to place the burden of proof on the party op-
posing jurisdiction. The decisions to date reaching a contrary conclusion
are decided incorrectly. Adherence to the traditional burden-of-proof rule
under complete diversity for interstate class actions would defeat the obvi-
ous purpose of CAFA and improperly restrict its scope as intended by
Congress.
320. Braud v. Trans. Serv. Co. of Ill., 445 F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2006) (reviewing CAFA's legislative
history with respect to new 28 U.S.C. 1453(b)); Wallace v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 444 F.3d 697
(5th Cir. 2006) (relying on CAFA's legislative history with respect to new 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1)); Patter-
son v. Dean Morris, L.L.P., 444 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2006) (relying on CAFA's legislative history in con-
struing new 28 U.S.C. § 1433(c)(1) and (c)(2)).
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